military · geopolitical

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Iran-US sign 14-point deal at Versailles: In 1919, the same place hosted a treaty after World War I that created conditions for World War II

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Iran-US Deal: US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding at France's Palace of Versailles, aiming to end hostilities and setting a 60-day negotiation timeline. The agreement includes commitments on military operations, the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's nuclear program, and sanctions relief, marking a significant diplomatic moment at a historically charged venue.

about 15 hours ago

military · geopolitical

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Israel's 'kill first' strategy is now aimed at Turkey. Will the region respond?

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Israel's 'kill first' strategy is now aimed at Turkey. Will the region respond? Submitted by David Hearst on Tue, 06/30/2026 - 18:10 Hard power is needed to halt Tel Aviv's reckless quest to redraw the borders of the Middle East A protester holds a placard outside the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, during a demonstration against a previous Israeli war on Gaza in July 2014 (Nicolas Asfouri/AFP) Off The US administration has signed two mutually contradictory deals to end its war on Iran . The power Israel lost to dictate the terms of peace on Iran , it has sought to regain in Lebanon . It was helped, enormously, by the Lebanese government, which signed away both sovereignty over its land and its duty to seek legal redress for the war crimes Israel has committed . Under the deal that US President Donald Trump signed with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Washington accepted an explicit link between Iran and Lebanon by agreeing to an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon”. That commitment, if implemented, makes the second deal signed in Washington on Friday between representatives of the Lebanese, Israeli and US governments obsolete. This “framework” gives Israeli forces, occupying large swathes of southern Lebanon, indefinite leave to remain. .push({}); In the first deal, the US promised to respect Iranian sovereignty, including over the Strait of Hormuz. In the second, its ally, Israel, has no obligation to respect Lebanese sovereignty, which is further weakened by the creation of a “military coordination group ” run in Washington. The agreement obliges the Lebanese army, kept deliberately weak by the veto Washington and Israel exercise on the weapons it can deploy , to disarm a battle-hardened armed group, seen by many in Lebanon as the only credible deterrent against Israeli attack and settlement. The framework deal further obliges the government of Lebanon to grant immunity to Israeli troops and generals over the war crimes they have committed in the invasion. Article 13 signs away the right of the Lebanese government to pursue legal complaints against Israel in international courts, according to legal experts. Threat of Lebanese civil war More than one million people have been forcibly displaced in Lebanon since October 2023, and at least 8,000 have been killed . Many of Israel’s strikes have targeted civilians , including journalists and healthcare workers. According to Halima Kaakour, a Lebanese MP and international law expert, “the clause reflects a political decision by the Lebanese authorities not to pursue action before international forums in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal - which is itself a right and should not have to be traded for anything else”. .push({}); There was fury on the streets of Beirut, so much so that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam was reportedly obliged to thank Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament, for calming things down, as Berri vowed to block the deal’s passage to avert a potential civil war. Considering Lebanon’s history, this warning should not be taken lightly. The morning after the Lebanon 'agreement' Read More » “Those who prepared this agreement want to ignite a fitna [civil strife], but I don’t want it, and I am pressing to prevent the explosion,” Berri said. “Even Hezbollah is working on internal calming, but they persist in pushing forward with an agreement that is worse than the May 17 Agreement … they want a fitna.” Berri said the region could pay the price for what he called a “tug of war” inside the US administration. As Lebanon’s chief predator, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was delighted by the Washington deal, dismissing the two areas around the Litani River from which Israeli forces promised to withdraw as insignificant. Netanyahu also called the deal a “major blow” to Iran, saying: “Iran is trying to force us into a withdrawal from southern Lebanon by force. In effect, Israel, Lebanon and the United States are telling them: this is none of your business.” The two deals are so different because they have two competing authors in the US administration engaged in the “tug of war” to which Berri alluded. Trump’s deal with Iran reflects the thinking of Vice President JD Vance, who must have felt vindicated by the total failure of US-Israeli air strikes to achieve regime change. Vance made little secret of his opposition to the joint strikes, and he was conspicuous by his absence from the situation room in February, when Trump made the decision to launch the war on Iran after being briefed by Netanyahu and David Barnea , then the Mossad director. 'Sunni axis' rhetoric The Washington framework deal for Israel and Lebanon was the work of Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He continues to be signed up to the goal of regime change in Iran, as he was in Venezuela and is in Cuba. Rubio thinks that Hezbollah’s disarmament must be a condition of peace, as opposed to a consequence of a negotiated political settlement, and that Israel should remain the undisputed regional hegemon. Vance clearly sees too many downsides to continuing the bombing campaign in Iran, not least of which is the hammering that 20 US military sites in the region took from Iranian missiles and drones, among them a major naval base in Bahrain , alongside the time it will take to replenish its stockpile of Tomahawk missiles. .push({}); Rubio, on the other hand, persists in the myth that Hezbollah is foreign to Lebanon and is merely a tool of Iran. Turkey has become Israel's latest existential enemy. As if in unison, a chorus of Israeli politicians have raised the alarm about a new 'Sunni axis' opening up The Iran war was a clear setback to Israel’s regional plans. But in an obvious sign that the war would have continued even if the US and Israel had achieved regime change in Tehran, the political establishment in Tel Aviv has now turned its attention to Turkey . As day follows night, Turkey has become Israel’s latest existential enemy. As if in unison, a chorus of Israeli politicians has raised the alarm about a new “ Sunni axis ” opening up, composed of Turkey, Syria and Qatar . This has not gone down well with Trump, who had little hesitation in laughing off the notion that his best regional friend, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was “an antisemitic dictator” who has been “committing genocide against the Kurds”, as Netanyahu now claims . “Erdogan is a great leader, a very strong person…Everything I’ve ever asked from him, he’s done,” Trump said . When Netanyahu said Israel’s “new” security doctrine was to “kill them first”, Vance was blunter still. Addressing two far-right ministers of Netanyahu’s cabinet, but in reality speaking to the prime minister himself, Vance said: “You’re a country of nine million people. You can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem.” Laying the groundwork But Israel is as serious about setting on Turkey as it was about Iran. Firstly, the rhetoric against Turkey is bipartisan. It is the leitmotif of the man tipped to replace Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett, who has said that a new Turkish threat is emerging: “I want to be very clear. Turkey and Qatar have gained influence in Syria, are seeking influence elsewhere and everywhere throughout the region, and from here I warn - Turkey is the new Iran.” The theme was picked up by Amichai Chikli , the diaspora affairs minister, who said the era of the “Shia empire of Iran” was over. In its shoes, he added, walks a new axis: “the Muslim Brotherhood axis of Erdogan’s Turkey, Syria and Qatar. And it’s better to open your eyes now.” Secondly, the groundwork for Israel’s latest campaign was laid as far back as November 2024, when a month before the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said Israel should reach out to its natural allies - the Kurds and the Druze. When Assad fell, Israel obliterated the Syrian navy and air force, and invaded an area of southern Syria larger than Gaza. Tel Aviv has openly pushed for a federal Syria, fragmented into confessional cantons. Netanyahu now calls the land his forces occupy in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza “ security belts ”, from which he has no intention of withdrawing. Through these means, Israel has aimed to limit the authority of the national government in Damascus formed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and to challenge Turkey’s relationship with a post-Assad Syria. Israel has also consciously tried to reanimate tensions between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, including by supplying Cyprus with Barak MX air defence missiles. Israel is being given privileged status at an air base in Paphos, while Cyprus is reportedly exploring the purchase of Indian supersonic missiles and drones. All of these moves have one common goal: to challenge Turkey’s rising naval power. A recent Maariv article argues that Turkey is increasingly being seen in Israeli strategic circles as a more significant long-term challenge than Iran. It’s not just the aircraft carriers being built or the strength of its drones, radar and advanced electronic warfare capabilities, the analysis notes, but also Ankara’s expanding diplomatic and military footprint across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Another Israeli minister, Gila Gamliel, has said that Israel was preparing to confront “the Ottoman Empire”. Shifting mood Turkey’s reaction to Israel’s moves has been cautious, some would say too much so. Put Erdogan’s rhetoric to one side, and consider what Turkey actually did when Israel invaded Syria and bombed its air force and navy. Turkey and Israel held talks on a deconfliction line after Israel attacked military sites in Syria, including the Hama and Tiyas air bases, where Turkey had been planning to deploy. Throughout the assault on Gaza , Turkey kept oil from Azerbaijan flowing to Israel via its port of Ceyhan - most likely one of the “things” Trump asked Erdogan to do. Activists with the Stop Fuelling Genocide campaign released evidence suggesting that the “Seavigour” tanker had shipped crude oil from Turkey’s Ceyhan Port to a pipeline near Ashkelon in Israel at least eight times in 2024 after Turkey announced a trade embargo. Turkish officials have also downplayed the rhetoric coming from Netanyahu as being for domestic purposes only. They have emphasised the hotlines that the Turkish military set up with the Israeli army, the fact that Turkish generals opposed any confrontation with Israel in Syria, and the communications between Turkish and Israeli security agencies. Why Turkey must challenge Israeli moves in Syria Read More » Even after Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party was hammered over Turkey’s lack of action on Gaza in local elections in 2024, the series of measures Ankara subsequently took were mostly diplomatic and predicated on getting Trump and his ambassador, Tom Barrack , on side over Syria. Today, the mood music in Ankara has changed, and there is an acceptance that Israel means what it says about the coming confrontation. Turkey is focused on building up its deterrence, be it naval, air force or drones. Trump is now giving Turkey the engines it needs to build its new-generation Kaan stealth fighter, while Ankara is accelerating construction of a 60,000-tonne aircraft carrier and building 30 other warships . It also recently carried out a joint exercise with the Egyptian navy . Even so, Turkey is playing for time. Turkish defence analysts think it will take three to five years for the country’s air defence systems to reach operational capacity against Israel’s air force. Turkey’s main response to Gaza was to focus on the creation of a defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan , the same regional powers that helped to mediate the US-Iran deal. That is what Israel fears and is now fighting to dismantle. Whatever happens now in the Gulf, the main battle line between Israel and the region will be drawn in Lebanon and Syria. The lesson from all of this is that Israel means what it says when its prime minister vows to alter the borders of the Middle East. Hard power is needed to stop this. The more Arab nations in the region delay their response or simply fall back weakly on their relations with Washington, the bigger the shock they will get when Israel “kills first”. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. War on Iran Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Iran, Oman to jointly charge fees along Strait of Hormuz: Report

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Iran, Oman to jointly charge fees along Strait of Hormuz: Report Submitted by MEE staff on Tue, 06/30/2026 - 17:05 Muscat appears to be trying to find a workaround so Iran does not impose a unilateral, mandatory toll for use of the critical waterway The Liberian-flagged container vessel MSC Reef is seen docked along a pier at the Khor Fakkan Container Terminal, the only natural deep-sea port in the region and one of the major container ports in Sharjah emirate, along the Gulf of Oman, on 28 June 2026 (AFP) Off Iran and Oman are looking to jointly impose a service fee for use of the Strait of Hormuz, despite open US objections, The New York Times reported on Tuesday, citing an Iranian official and four diplomats. The 14-point plan signed by the US and Iran earlier this month stipulates that the Strait of Hormuz would see "the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge", but much like the rest of the agreement, it is only valid for the 60-day negotiation period. However, Iran and Oman are mandated to develop a plan as part of the deal. Charging a toll as part of a new, post-war business model in the region, however, reverses centuries of free transit through the waterway. Oman would like the fee to be voluntary, while Iran insists the fee should be mandatory, the unnamed sources who spoke to the NYT said. .push({}); Muscat hopes the amounts paid will cover the costs of maintaining safe navigation practices along the maritime route, akin to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. But on Monday, Iran’s deputy foreign minister said that if an agreement is not reached with Oman, Tehran would impose its own fees. 'We'll have to blow them up' Last month, US President Donald Trump threatened to attack Oman, in remarks that offered a window into what several US officials have told Middle East Eye is the administration’s frustration with Muscat amid the US-Israeli war on Iran. Trump said he would “blow up” the country if it agreed to work with Iran to impose a fee for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz as part of a settlement to end the war on the Islamic Republic. “The strait is going to be open to everybody. Nobody is going to control it…it’s international waters,” Trump said. 'From outlier to trailblazer': How Oman offers a glimpse into the post-war Gulf Read More » “Oman will behave just like everybody else, or we’ll have to blow them up,” he added. Trump’s outburst left US diplomats scrambling to preserve ties, while pressing Oman, unsuccessfully, to issue a statement denouncing Iran’s claims about a toll, Arab and US officials previously told MEE. Oman, a longtime US ally that has played a mediating role in multiple conflicts, did not publicly respond to the remarks, but a later private discussion between an Omani diplomat and US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent revealed assurances that Muscat had " no plans for tolling the Strait". In the war’s early days, when other Gulf states opened their military bases to the US and joined the attack on Iran, Oman was called an outlier among its neighbours because of its criticism of the US and its reluctance to enter the fray. But Muscat's decision has now been vindicated by a ceasefire that is widely viewed as a victory for Iran in the Gulf. Oman is the US’s oldest treaty partner in the Gulf, going back to 1833. War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Israel always knew southern Lebanon Shia villages ‘had to disappear’, minister says

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Israel always knew southern Lebanon Shia villages ‘had to disappear’, minister says Submitted by Ayse Betul on Tue, 06/30/2026 - 15:08 Israel’s Operation Silver Plow has served as a cover for the systematic destruction and depopulation of residential border villages Destruction seen after Israeli military strikes on a neighbourhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre, 23 June 2026 (Joseph Eid/AFP) Off The destruction of villages in southern Lebanon was inevitable from the beginning of Israel ’s invasion, an Israeli minister openly admitted on Monday. Defence Minister Israel Katz said during a briefing with military correspondents that “it was clear during Operation Silver Plow that the Shia villages along the contact line had to disappear”. He hinted that the Israeli military sought the total destruction of border towns along the "Yellow Line" , the buffer zone south of the Litani River. Deepening this zone ultimately aims at the demilitarisation of Hezbollah and the Israeli army, Katz said, adding that the army “will not retreat an inch” before this happens. "We are currently in a situation where there is nearly 100 percent destruction in the contact-line villages of the western and central sectors. In the eastern sector, we are at 73 percent of villages destroyed," he said. .push({}); "Seizing territory and dismantling all infrastructure within it is the heaviest blow possible for jihadist organisations." Israeli forces have driven hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians from the south, most of them from the Shia population. Katz said none of them would return to the Yellow Line area, which “must remain free of population”. This is not the first time Israeli officials said their objective in southern Lebanon extended beyond toppling Hezbollah. Systematic destruction Israel launched “Operation Silver Plow” in April, saying its aim was to clear Lebanese villages along the border of Hezbollah troops. .push({}); Since then, the operation has seen the targeting of residential areas and buildings, with forces ordering demolitions using heavy equipment alongside continuous air strikes across the area. According to a May report by the Israeli outlet Haaretz, since the start of the operation Israeli military commanders admitted that homes, schools and government buildings near the Lebanese border were being demolished to “clear the area”. Some other unnamed Israeli soldiers have told Haaretz that the army is not limited to targeting “terrorist infrastructure” as Israeli authorities claim, instead they “destroy everything”. “At the end of every day, there's an assessment of what was accomplished, and every commander is required to report how many homes he destroyed,” one of them added. The New York Times corroborated the systematic destruction by analysing satellite imagery. .push({}); Vicious cycle While Israeli military incursions across Syria, Gaza and Lebanon have dominated the weeks-long negotiations between Tehran and Washington, talks on the Lebanese front have become an endless cycle. The morning after the Lebanon 'agreement' Read More » Iran repeatedly reiterated that Lebanon was an inseparable part of any agreement with the US to end the war. Similarly, the Islamabad-drafted Memorandum of Understanding called for an end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon. While the Trump administration has openly stated that it ordered Israel to withdraw its troops from Lebanese territory, Israel insisted that it will not do so until Hezbollah disarms. Hezbollah refuses to disarm until Israel leaves Lebanon, adding that any attempt to link Israel’s withdrawal to demanding the group’s disarmament would cross its “red lines”. Meanwhile, this entire vicious cycle is ultimately buying Israel additional time, allowing it to delay a military withdrawal and keep targeting civilians to depopulate the area. In his latest briefing, Katz stated that Israel plans to maintain a "long-term" presence in Lebanon, adding, "The equation stands - rocket fire on Israeli communities (by Iran) means an immediate assault on the Dahieh.” More than 4,200 Lebanese have been killed by Israel since 2 March, according to Lebanon's health ministry. Iran-Israel tensions News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Lebanon’s Israel framework deal draws broad opposition but little appetite for confrontation

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Lebanon’s Israel framework deal draws broad opposition but little appetite for confrontation Submitted by Adam Chamseddine on Tue, 06/30/2026 - 15:08 Criticism has extended beyond Hezbollah’s allies, but political factions appear determined to contain the fallout while awaiting the outcome of Iran-US negotiations US, Lebanese and Israeli officials at a signing ceremony in Washington on 26 June (AFP/Saul Loeb) Off The US -brokered framework agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel in Washington on 26 June has triggered widespread political opposition in Lebanon , raising questions over sovereignty, accountability and the balance of obligations imposed on both sides. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s presentation of the agreement as an achievement for Israel intensified the backlash, reinforcing the view amongst Lebanese critics that Beirut had made substantial concessions without securing an immediate ceasefire or a binding timetable for Israel’s withdrawal. Under the framework, the Lebanese army would assume control of designated “pilot zones”, dismantle the infrastructure of non-state armed groups and verify their disarmament before Israeli forces gradually redeploy. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have defended the agreement as the start of a process intended to restore state sovereignty and secure a complete Israeli withdrawal. But the political response has exposed a wide gap between the official narrative and the way much of Lebanon’s political class has interpreted the deal. .push({}); Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem described the agreement as “a humiliation, a disgrace and a surrender of sovereignty”, declaring it effectively null and void. The Higher Islamic Shia Council called it an “agreement of submission” imposed under American pressure, comparing it to the failed 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel and warning that it would deepen internal divisions. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and the head of Amal movement said the framework was unbalanced and consolidated realities that served Israel at Lebanon’s expense. He warned that it carried serious political and sovereignty-related risks and could not serve as the basis for a just agreement protecting Lebanon’s rights and institutions. 'The Lebanese state wanted to say that it is not a card in Iran’s hands, that it has a different path, and that we are the decision-makers, not Iran' - Lebanese presidential source Walid Jumblatt, the former leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, criticised the negotiating team for overlooking Lebanon’s 1949 armistice agreement with Israel, which he noted had been referenced in the 1989 Taif Agreement, Aoun’s inaugural address and the government’s ministerial statement. The Free Patriotic Movement, the largest Christian party, said it supported a comprehensive and lasting peace, but argued that such a settlement could not be achieved through surrendering to Israeli demands or sacrificing Lebanese rights. It reiterated its support for placing weapons and decisions of war and peace exclusively in the hands of the state, while warning against pursuing that objective through internal conflict. The Popular Nasserist Organisation, a left-wing pan-Arab party, also rejected the agreement, saying it threatened Lebanese sovereignty and imposed unfair conditions affecting what it called the right of resistance. The breadth of opposition is politically significant. It extends beyond Hezbollah and its traditional ally Amal to Jumblatt, the Free Patriotic Movement and other forces that are not uniformly aligned with Hezbollah. Support has so far been concentrated among a smaller group of parties, largely within the Christian right, including the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party, the National Liberal Party and several independent MPs. More than just Hezbollah The breadth of dissent makes it difficult for the presidency and government to present criticism simply as an Iranian-backed campaign against the Lebanese state. .push({}); There is also the challenge of domestic ratification of the agreement, which will eventually have to be approved in parliament or government. 'They're not all Hezbollah': Trump criticises Israel killing civilians in Lebanon Read More » Despite the severity of the opposition, however, the dispute has remained largely confined to statements and political positioning. A source in the Lebanese presidency told Middle East Eye that communication had taken place with opponents of the agreement to prevent the crisis from developing into an internal confrontation. Despite the rejectionist and escalatory positions, “there is an understanding with all the objecting parties not to blow up the situation internally,” the source said. According to the source, an influential Arab actor intervened to lower tensions and received a positive response from the major parties, particularly Amal, Hezbollah’s closest political ally. “There is work under way to control the post-agreement phase internally,” the source added. This restraint reflects an understanding that any confrontation over Hezbollah’s weapons could deepen Lebanon’s sectarian and political fragmentation and create conditions that benefit Israel. The presidency has portrayed the Washington negotiations as an assertion of Lebanese independence from Iran. Distancing Lebanon from Iran According to the presidential source, one of the agreement’s central objectives was to demonstrate that Lebanon was not merely a bargaining card in Tehran’s negotiations with Washington. “The Lebanese state wanted to say that it is not a card in Iran’s hands, that it has a different path, and that we are the decision-makers, not Iran,” the source said. The source added that this was also the outcome sought by friendly Arab states and the United States. Yet the framework has produced a contradiction at the heart of this sovereignty narrative. .push({}); Lebanon’s obligations regarding disarmament, security control and the dismantling of non-state military infrastructure are explicit and measurable. Israel’s withdrawal, by contrast, remains gradual and conditional. The presidential source said Lebanon had received American guarantees that implementation in the pilot zones would be supervised by Washington, without direct coordination between the Lebanese and Israeli armies. Damascus races to reassure Beirut as Trump pushes Syria to take on Hezbollah Read More » They added that the visit of the head of US Central Command to Beirut was intended to reinforce this mechanism and that the pilot-zone model could later be expanded if it succeeded. According to the source, Lebanon had requested the security annex remain secret, saying the US State Department asked both parties whether they wanted it kept confidential and both agreed. Another controversial provision requires Lebanon and Israel to halt hostile or adverse activity against one another in international political and legal forums. Critics argue that this could restrict Lebanon’s ability to pursue accountability for alleged Israeli violations or support victims seeking justice. Thousands of Lebanese civilians have been killed in Israeli strikes since March, and in the earlier phase of the conflict with Hezbollah. The presidential source defended the negotiating team’s position, saying it believed Israel could benefit more from international litigation because Hezbollah had initiated the fighting by firing the first rockets. The source added that the clause would not prevent individuals, organisations or unofficial associations from independently pursuing legal action. Opponents counter that victims and NGOs cannot replace the legal authority, evidence and diplomatic weight of the Lebanese state. For now, Lebanon appears to have entered a phase of controlled confrontation: widespread rejection of the agreement combined with a shared reluctance to allow the dispute to become violent. Part of that restraint stems from Arab and American intervention. But it also reflects a belief that the Washington framework may not be implemented in its current form. Its fate may ultimately depend less on what was signed in Washington than on the separate negotiations between Iran and the United States in Switzerland, where the war in Lebanon, a ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal remain part of the wider regional settlement. Lebanon has entered a highly sensitive political storm, but one that political factions appear determined to contain while waiting to see whether the agreement is implemented, renegotiated or overtaken by the broader US-Iran track. Israel normalisation deals News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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How the UAE continued supporting Sudan's RSF through Haftar and Libya

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How the UAE continued supporting Sudan's RSF through Haftar and Libya Submitted by Oscar Rickett on Tue, 06/30/2026 - 12:10 Sudanese paramilitary fighters are being trained in Libya, new investigation finds, as UAE continues to deny involvement Libyan army vehicles take part in the "Dara’ al-Karama 2" military exercises, conducted by the Libyan National Army, under the command of Khalifa Haftar, in the Ras al-Alba region in southeastern Libya on 16 May 2026 (AFP) Off Sudanese , Egyptian and Libyan sources have revealed the shifting nature of the United Arab Emirates ’ support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through Libya, as a new investigation has uncovered the presence of military camps training RSF fighters there. Despite the pressure brought on Abu Dhabi by the war on Iran and an Egyptian bombing campaign targeting RSF weapons convoys that originate in Libya, the UAE and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) are still supporting the Sudanese paramilitary group, which has been widely accused of genocide. Fighters from the RSF are also being trained to use weapons supplied by the UAE at military camps across Libya, a joint investigation from Lighthouse Reports, Sudan War Monitor and Evident revealed on Monday. Defectors from the RSF and sources from the LAAF said that the five camps identified by investigators were also used to provide the Sudanese paramilitary with logistical support, including fuel and pickup trucks. An RSF defector, identified as Ahmed, said the weapons and other supplies were “all Emirati”. .push({}); “Emirates is the one supporting the RSF. They would bring it from their country by a plane to here and from here we would receive them and deliver them to Sudan,” he said. Ahmed was one of seven RSF defectors in Libya who participated in training camps or smuggling operations. Middle East Eye has reported extensively on collaboration between the LAAF – particularly its Subul al-Salam brigade - and the RSF, and on the supply of weapons through the border triangle region that straddles Chad, Libya and Sudan. Since the war in Sudan between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) began in April 2023, the RSF has collaborated with Haftar’s forces, which are supported and supplied by the UAE. Four newly-identified sites believed to be RSF training camps (© 2026 MapTiler / OpenStreetMap contributors/ via Avaaz / Lighthouse Reports/ Evident/ Sudan War Monitor) .push({}); Both the UAE and the LAAF have denied any involvement in the war in Sudan. In a statement, the Emirati foreign ministry said: “The UAE has not provided and is not providing military or financial support to any warring party in Sudan.” The RSF also denies being supported by the UAE. RSF fighters training in Libya The four new camps identified by the investigation are at Seweidiya, near al-Kufra; Sabha; al-Jufra and Camp 17, near Benghazi, in eastern Libya. Ahmed said he was taken to the triangle region, “from where we travelled to Kufra”, a key LAAF base in the remote desert southeast of Libya. 'If the RSF lost UAE support, if UAE stopped supporting them, the RSF won't be able to fight' - Ahmed, Rapid Support Forces' defector “Then from Kufra they moved us to Benghazi,” the RSF defector said. “From Benghazi they transported us to a camp, that is Camp 17. That camp has the supplies, and everything sent to support the war is dropped there.” Ahmed said he had witnessed how the UAE brought in weapons and military vehicles by plane for the RSF. “If the RSF lost UAE support, if UAE stopped supporting them, the RSF won't be able to fight in the field anymore, it will break apart,” he told investigators. Ahmed said most ammunition boxes, weapons, and vehicles did not have branding to indicate that they were from the UAE, but that one armoured car did. “You could see ‘Made in Emirates’,” he said. Part of the training at the camps includes instruction in the use of heavy weaponry and heavy machinery, including the DShk heavy machine gun, RPGs and rocket launchers. Investigators also identified Colombian mercenaries at the camps in Libya. According to a Human Rights Watch report from May , they are contracted by Global Security Services Group, a UAE-based company with links to the Emirati government. Middle East Eye recently revealed the existence of an RSF training camp in Ethiopia. The UAE and the Sudan war Despite persistent denials, the UAE has been the primary foreign actor in Sudan’s war. Abu Dhabi’s relationship with RSF chief Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who is better known as Hemedti, goes back many years to when he was a key part of the Sudanese state. Gold from Dagalo family mines in Darfur, western Sudan, is exported to the markets of Dubai, while RSF mercenaries – who were then also part of the Sudanese state - fought for the Saudi- and UAE-backed coalition in Yemen. 'Far from receding, Emirati interference is returning with full force: the UAE is aggressively re-escalating its support for the RSF via eastern Libya' - Jalel Harchaoui, analyst As allies of the Emiratis, the Haftars have also assisted the RSF in Sudan, though this has brought them into direct conflict with Egypt, which – along with Turkey and now Saudi Arabia - supports the Sudanese army. Last November, Egyptian and Turkish forces began bombing RSF convoys running from Libyan territory controlled by the LAAF. This, according to Egyptian, Sudanese, and Libyan official and intelligence sources who spoke to MEE, led to the temporary closure of al-Kufra air base and to a change in tactics from the UAE. A senior Egyptian military source said that rather than ending its operations in the wake of Egyptian pressure, Abu Dhabi rerouted flights to eastern Chad, relying on Amdjarass airport, a facility it had already used alongside Kufra to move weapons and foreign fighters to the RSF. Flight tracking data supports this theory, showing an uptick in flights from the UAE and Libya to Amdjarass. “The flights didn’t stop,” the Egyptian military source said. “They were simply redirected - from Libya to Chad, and specifically to Amdjarass.” Satellite images show a suspected RSF training camp near Benghazi, Libya (© 2026, Vantor, via Sudan War Monitor/ Lighthouse Reports / Evident) .push({}); "Since April 2023, the UAE has been pouring military resources into eastern Libya, with the active assistance of the Haftar family, for onward transfer to Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces," Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst focusing on Libya and political economy, told MEE. "Several recent developments might have suggested that this Emirati policy was being constrained and would gradually taper off. "Since November 2025, Turkish and Egyptian forces have been striking RSF convoys as they move from southeastern Libya into northern Darfur. Saudi Arabia has intensified its diplomatic engagement with Saddam Haftar," he said, referring to one of Khalifa's sons, who is the LAAF's chief of staff. "Yet data from the past few days points to a major comeback by Abu Dhabi in Libya," Harchaoui said. "Far from receding, Emirati interference is returning with full force: the UAE is aggressively re-escalating its support for the RSF via eastern Libya." Emirati operations in Chad The Egyptian military source said the UAE had long maintained air routes linking Libya and Chad, moving military support and mercenaries - including fighters from Colombia and Chad - to the RSF. The UAE also has, according to the senior Egyptian army sources, a military operations room inside Amdjarass airport to coordinate with the RSF. 'Emirati companies carried out extensive construction and expansion work at Amdjarass airport' - Egyptian commander Emirati companies carried out extensive construction and expansion work at the airport that wasn’t limited or symbolic development “There is a fully equipped Emirati operations room inside the airport,” one of the sources, an Egyptian commander, said. “From there, operations linked to the RSF are managed using advanced technology.” Meanwhile, according to this commander, Egypt has documented the ongoing changes through imagery gathered by multiple security agencies amid a growing Emirati military footprint inside the airport. “Emirati companies carried out extensive construction and expansion work at the airport that wasn’t limited or symbolic development,” he told MEE. “What happened was large-scale expansion and the construction of new facilities.” Exclusive: The Ethiopian army base covertly supporting Sudan’s RSF Read More » “We tracked significant expansion inside an Emirati base at Amdjarass, including hangars for drones and infrastructure capable of receiving Ilyushin cargo aircraft - among the largest military transport planes in the world,” the source explained. The UAE has insisted throughout much of the war that its activities at Amdjarass are humanitarian. Egypt supports the Sudanese army. MEE’s sources also detailed a new weapons corridor that runs through Gate 17 on the Libya-Chad border, and then deep into the Chadian interior before it gets to Abeche in central-eastern Chad. From there it runs to Adre, the Chadian border town with Sudan that hosts hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the war, and into Darfur, the vast region of western Sudan controlled by the RSF. At least 200,000 people are believed to have been killed during the war in Sudan, which is regarded as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. The UAE’s support for the RSF has gone unchallenged by western powers, including the UK and US. Sudan war News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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From pwned to kiting – an A to Z of the gaming terms you need to know

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As phrases like easter eggs and looksmaxxing enter everyday language, what other words from the world of video games might soon be mainstream? Twenty years ago, video games were seen as a niche hobby dominated by hardcore enthusiasts, tucked away in obscure online forums and gaming meet-ups. Back then, the idea that governments would use footage from Call of Duty and gaming terms such as “killstreaks” as war propaganda would have been absurd. Then the 2010s happened: nerd culture popularised, previously online-only spaces began to meld with the real world, and gaming went mainstream. Now, gaming references have entered common parlance – at the end of 2024, video game terms including “cheat code” and “cutscene” were even added to the Oxford English Dictionary – and they increasingly crop up in politics, too. Earlier this year, the official White House X account posted footage of military strikes on Iran interspersed with footage from the video game Grand Theft Auto. Six days later, another video was posted , this time interspersing military footage with clips from Nintendo’s 2006 game Wii Sports. Video game references aren’t reserved for the political right, either: in February 2026, Democrat representative of New York Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez quipped , “Why does this guy always talk like a World of Warcraft npc [non-player character]?” in response to a post on X by Stephen Miller, White House deputy chief of staff. Continue reading...

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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A Critical Moment for Russia

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The Ukrainian military has been attacking Russian energy infrastructure for some time now, so last week’s drone strikes against oil refineries and storage tanks, including one in Moscow, are better seen as the escalation of a longer campaign than as a change in Ukraine’s strategy in the war. It goes without saying that oil is still essential to the Russian economy and the war effort. The point of the attacks, then, was to show that Kyiv can limit the amount of money Russia can make from selling oil at a time when there is a global shortage. Russia, meanwhile, has […] The post A Critical Moment for Russia appeared first on Geopolitical Futures .

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Democratic lawmaker backs bid to halt Israel aid

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Democratic lawmaker backs bid to halt Israel aid US Representative Greg Casar said he plans to vote in favour of an amendment that would halt military aid to Israel, arguing that Americans "should not be financing more weapons for Netanyahu". "The Israeli government committed war crimes in Gaza and helped drag America into war with Iran," the Texas Democrat wrote on X. "Americans should not be financing more weapons for Netanyahu." The amendment, introduced by Republican Representative Thomas Massie, would cancel $3.3bn in annual US aid to Israel and remove funding earmarked for Israel in the State Department appropriations bill. The proposal is expected to come up for a vote in the House later this week.

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Congresswoman seeks vote on US backing of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Lebanon

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Congresswoman seeks vote on US backing of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Lebanon US Representative Rashida Tlaib said she will force another vote in Congress aimed at ending US involvement in what she described as Israel’s “campaign of ethnic cleansing and territorial expansion” in Lebanon. “Congress must vote to end U.S. support for these atrocities and force an end to Israel’s invasion and illegal military occupation of Lebanese territory,” Tlaib wrote on X. She added that “over 4,250 people have been massacred” and that “twelve children are killed or maimed every day as these U.S.-backed war crimes continue”. The Michigan Democrat has been one of the most outspoken critics of US military support for Israel and has repeatedly called for Congress to restrict or end assistance linked to Israeli military operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Tomorrow, I will force another vote to end U.S. participation in the Israeli apartheid regime's campaign of ethnic cleansing and territorial expansion in Lebanon. Over 4,250 people have been massacred. Twelve children are killed or maimed every day as these U.S.-backed war… — Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib (@RepRashida) June 29, 2026

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Turkey, Arab nations condemn Israeli incursions into Syria

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Turkey, Arab nations condemn Israeli incursions into Syria Turkey and several Arab nations and organisations have condemned Israel's latest incursions and attacks in Syria's southern provinces of Quneitra and Deraa. Turkey said the Israeli actions violated Syria's "territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty", harmed civilians and made conditions in the region increasingly difficult. Saudi Arabia expressed its "total rejection" of what it described as the intimidation of civilians by Israeli forces and condemned violations of international law. Qatar called the incursions “a flagrant violation of Syria’s sovereignty and a blatant breach of international law.” Kuwait said the continued attacks undermined efforts to preserve regional security and stability. UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the incursions were a flagrant violation of international law and the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel, which Israel is obliged to respect. Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit warned that ongoing Israeli military operations in Syria could ignite a wider regional conflict. Gulf Cooperation Council secretary general Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi described them as a "flagrant violation" of Syria's sovereignty and a "dangerous escalation" that would fuel tensions and instability across the region.

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Morning update

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Morning update Good morning Middle East Eye readers, Conflicting messages emerged over the future of US-Iran diplomacy after President Donald Trump suggested an important meeting could take place in Doha, while Tehran denied any planned negotiations. Iran says conditions for a final agreement have not yet been met and insists implementation of key provisions of the memorandum of understanding must come first. Meanwhile, tensions persist over the Strait of Hormuz and the Lebanon framework agreement. Here are the latest updates: Trump said a meeting in Doha could prove important and claimed progress was being made on efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Iran's foreign ministry denied reports of a planned meeting with the United States, saying only an expert delegation would travel to Doha to follow up on frozen asset issues. Tehran said it has not yet entered negotiations on a final agreement and that implementation of several key memorandum provisions remains a prerequisite. Iranian officials informed Oman that shipping arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz must change and said conditions would not return to their pre-war status. Iran rejected French proposals related to demining operations in the Strait of Hormuz, warning against actions it described as provocative. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said the country had emerged as an influential regional power despite months of military and economic pressure. Israeli defence minister Yisrael Katz said there would be no additional withdrawals from southern Lebanon beyond two pilot zones until Hezbollah is disarmed. The Washington Post reported that the United States is expected to play a direct role in monitoring compliance with the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement. Centcom commander Admiral Brad Cooper met senior officials in Lebanon and Israel as Washington expanded its regional diplomatic and security engagement. Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz continued despite ongoing tensions, while several governments and maritime authorities monitored developments closely. People cross a street in Tehran past a billboard depicting Iran’s slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei kissing slain commander Qasem Soleimani near the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala, Iraq, 29 June 2026 (AFP)

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Has Greece become Israel's Trojan Horse in the Gulf?

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Has Greece become Israel's Trojan Horse in the Gulf? Submitted by Ali Bakir on Wed, 06/24/2026 - 17:17 Tel Aviv would like to remain present inside the emerging GCC security architecture - without needing to be directly welcome at the table Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis greets Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman prior to a meeting in Athens on 26 July 2022 (Yorgos Karahalis/AFP) On Over the past several years, and with particular intensity since late 2019, Athens has deepened its ties with the Gulf states in ways few might have predicted. At first glance, the relationship looks standard: a European nation gains access to energy and investments, while the Gulf states in turn gain a willing European partner. Looking closer, though, the details tell a different story. Greece’s push into the Gulf has unfolded in two phases, each running in parallel with the same two trends: a tightening alliance with Israel , and deepening friction with Turkey . The first push, from roughly 2016 to 2021, took shape as an anti-Turkey coalition. Built around the Greece-Israel-Cyprus axis, it sought to draw in France , Egypt , Libya’s Khalifa Haftar , Bashar al-Assad’s Syria , and against the backdrop of the 2017 blockade of Qatar , both the UAE and Saudi Arabia . While economic, energy and investment cooperation supplied the pretext for this coalition, security and defence were the main substance. The alignment came easily at the time, because Abu Dhabi and Riyadh were themselves informally aligning with Israeli regional policies on multiple levels. .push({}); In this context, Athens was able to sign several strategic agreements with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In November 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis signed a strategic partnership with the UAE, and a separate accord on foreign policy and defence, committing each side to assist the other if their sovereignty or territorial integrity were threatened. That same year, the UAE deployed assets to Greece for joint drills, and the two coordinated on Eastern Mediterranean security within a wider network linking Greece, Cyprus, Egypt , France and Israel. Extended reach Similarly, a landmark Greek-Saudi defence agreement in 2021 sent a Greek Patriot battery and personnel to the kingdom, alongside joint air exercises such as Falcon Eye, and a flurry of senior military visits. Greek-Saudi defence and security ties emerged like never before. But the anti-Turkey coalition architecture collapsed when its premise did. Once the 2017 Gulf crisis was resolved and ties between the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, were normalised , the Greek-Israeli scheme to enlist GCC states against Ankara lost its foundation. .push({}); A second Greek push towards the GCC states took place from 2023 to 2026, aligning with the same two trends: a strengthened alliance with Israel, and increasing friction with Turkey. Greece’s aims during this stage have been twofold: to extend the reach and influence of the Greek-Israeli coalition to the Gulf through defence and security ties, and to dilute (and possibly counter) Turkey’s growing weight and role in the Gulf, especially concerning Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. What makes this push distinct is how completely Athens has fused its security policy with Israel's, to a degree no other European state even approaches What makes this push distinct is how completely Athens has fused its security policy with Israel’s, to a degree no other European state even approaches, at a time when Israel is a global pariah whose top officials are facing arrest warrants over the state’s genocidal crimes. The numbers carry the argument. Greece’s flagship air-defence programme, called Achilles’ Shield , is a roughly $3.5bn effort to integrate three Israeli systems into a multi-layered air, missile and anti-drone defence network. Earlier this year, Athens added some $750m for precision rocket artillery from Elbit Systems, a system positioned along its frontier with Turkey. Israeli firms train Greek fighter pilots , while Israel Aerospace Industries’ 2023 acquisition of the Greek firm Intracom Defense opened the way to local production and technology transfer. Officers now move through one another’s command structures in numbers that make the relationship look less like a partnership than an integration. The Greek push into the Gulf facilitates Israel’s hegemonic agenda. Israel emerged from the Gaza war diplomatically constricted, legally exposed, and unwelcome across much of the region. It would like to remain present inside the emerging GCC security architecture without needing to be welcome at the table - and a trusted partner already trying to embed itself in the Gulf's defence circuits, carrying Israeli systems, doctrine and intelligence pipelines, is one way to manage that implicitly. Quiet recalibration Ankara is the other half of the equation. Turkey is the only Muslim-majority Nato state with a serious defence industry, a record of aligning with Arab and Islamic causes through the Gaza war, and the geographic weight to back its positions. Since the resolution of the 2017 Gulf crisis, GCC states have been quietly recalibrating towards Ankara, which now reads as a strategic partner rather than a competitor. Turkey’s efforts to establish a regional security architecture, or an “ axis of stability ” grounded in regional ownership - with the cooperation and coordination of key regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt - directly contradict Greece’s Middle Eastern policies. Turkey-Greece tensions: A clash of nationalisms Read More » If successfully implemented, this initiative could thwart Greece’s regional plans once again. Athens thus feels the need to assert its alliance with Israel and to counter Ankara not only in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also in other arenas where Turkey is active, including the Gulf. It is therefore unsurprising that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has positioned Greece, Cyprus and India within an Israeli “ hexagon of alliances ” designed to counter the emerging alignment of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. Last December, at the 10th Israel-Greece-Cyprus summit in Jerusalem, the leaders of the three nations pledged to deepen defence and security cooperation. Days earlier, Greek and Israeli media reported on potential plans for a 2,500-strong joint rapid-response force, comprising 1,000 troops each from Israel and Greece, and 500 from Cyprus, with air and naval components. It was openly cast as a mechanism to deter and restrain Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. During this period, Athens has concentrated on enhancing its geopolitical significance to the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, by focusing on energy, infrastructure and connectivity projects - such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and a fibre optic data cable initiative - in addition to defence and security. Notably, the IMEC deliberately excludes Turkey and Egypt. Anchored by Israel and India, it extends through the UAE and Saudi Arabia to Europe via Greece, pulling the GCC states closer towards the hexagon coalition. The fine print When the US-Israel-Iran war erupted this past February, Greece rushed to offer the GCC states defence and security assistance. Greek Defence Minister Nikos Dendias toured the Gulf states, visiting the UAE and Qatar in March and April, followed by a trip to Saudi Arabia . The visits were timed alongside a war in which Greek military facilities served as a logistical artery for the very strikes that triggered Iran ’s retaliatory missile attacks across Gulf capitals. A country that relies on Israel for its own air defences, posturing as a security provider for the GCC amid a regional war, appears to be offering something it does not truly possess - unless what it’s really offering is connectivity with another state’s system and agenda. Where, in that picture, does the Gulf sit - and who is carrying the picture into its rooms? When a nation becomes a major customer of another’s weapons industry, hosts its training facilities, absorbs its doctrine, integrates its officers, and openly coordinates against a third party, its own foreign policy begins to carry its ally’s imprint. This is evident in how their deeply enmeshed defence ecosystems behave; information, access and political weight begin to move in both directions almost reflexively. What lands on a Greek desk does not necessarily stay on a Greek desk. Moreover, the officials who sign cooperation accords in Riyadh are the same ones signing declarations in Jerusalem to define an alliance that is distinguished, in part, by what it stands against. The same Athens that buys Israeli air-defence systems to deter Turkey, is being invited to aid Gulf air-defence planning. The war has only sharpened this contradiction. This is the fine print that Gulf decision-makers should read before the next round of handshakes. When Greek, Israeli and Cypriot leaders define their alliance by whom it is meant to contain, and when that state is the very one the Gulf is moving towards, a key question emerges - and it answers itself. Where, in that picture, does the Gulf sit - and who is carrying the picture into its rooms? The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. Politics Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Israeli army raids Palestinian charity in Nablus, orders year-long closure

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Israeli army raids Palestinian charity in Nablus, orders year-long closure Israeli military forces raided the headquarters of the Solidarity Charity Association in the occupied West Bank’s Nablus on Tuesday, declaring the organisation closed for a year, the Palestinian news agency WAFA reported. According to local residents, military vehicles and trucks stormed the Balata and Askar refugee camps east of Nablus before troops broke into the charity's offices and vandalised the building for more than two hours. Israeli troops eventually sealed the entrance to the building and posted a military order declaring the association, also known as the Al-Tadamon Charitable Society, shut down on allegations of "supporting terrorism." A military cordon remains in place around the neighbourhood as the raid continues.

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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Japan aims to catch up on drone warfare by tapping Ukraine’s experience

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Japan is accelerating plans to acquire and develop drones for its military by stepping up cooperation with Ukraine and learning from Kyiv’s wartime experience against Russia as it seeks to deploy more unmanned systems across its territory in the Pacific. To complement this strategy, Japanese companies are boosting cooperation with their European counterparts to manufacture anti-submarine drones. “The entire international community has witnessed how warfare has changed since the outbreak of the...

2 days ago

military · geopolitical

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UK lays out defence plan with drones, self-flying fighter jets, no-crew submarines

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Self-flying fighter jets, uncrewed submarines and drones will be at the centre of Britain’s future military under a defence plan being announced on Tuesday that reflects a world of conflicts transformed by technology. The Defence Investment Plan has been repeatedly delayed as military leaders and Treasury officials wrangled over the cost of equipping the nation’s military for an increasingly dangerous world. Like other Nato countries, the UK is under pressure to increase defence spending to...

2 days ago