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Military · Geopolitical

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Denmark says Russian frigate fired flares at helicopter

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Denmark and Russia were at a war of words on Tuesday after Danish authorities accused a Russian frigate of firing flares at a Danish military helicopter. The armed forces said in a statement late on Monday that “one of the air force’s Fennec helicopters was today fired at with flares during a routine photographic operation of a Russian frigate, which was located in international waters off Gedser”, Denmark’s southernmost town. The frigate had fired “two flares towards the helicopter. One of the...

Military · Geopolitical

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Netanyahu 'offers Israeli services' in 'comprehensive war' against Houthis, says report

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Netanyahu 'offers Israeli services' in 'comprehensive war' against Houthis, says report Submitted by MEE staff on Tue, 09/15/2026 - 09:31 Al-Akhbar cites US diplomatic sources on Netanyahu’s offer as Israeli media report naval readiness and Saudi requests for Israeli assistance Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth attend the funeral of Senator Lindsey Graham in Washington, 28 July 2026 (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images via AFP) Off Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has offered "Israel’s services" to countries in the Arabian Peninsula and has expressed a willingness to participate in a “comprehensive war” against Ansar Allah, the Houthi movement in Yemen, Lebanese media have reported. The report, by Al-Akhbar editor Ibrahim al-Amin, said that Netanyahu was pressing Israel’s security establishment and military to prepare for possible action against Iran and Hezbollah. The proposed Israeli role was part of a "wider regional effort" to counter the Houthis and the threat to shipping through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, one of the world’s main maritime corridors, Israeli media said. The Houthi capture of Mocha and the group’s expanding position along Yemen’s western coast are a "growing Israeli concern", a separate Al-Akhbar report said. Israeli assessments feared control of the coast and Bab al-Mandeb could add pressure on shipping and strain the US-led maritime protection, the report said. Israeli intelligence agencies were closely monitoring Ansar Allah’s movements, fearing that control of Mocha could increase the group’s ability to influence tankers and ships entering the Red Sea, it added. The newspaper also cited Israeli assessments that the Houthi advance “may require intensifying Israeli naval activity in the vicinity of Bab al-Mandeb. ” What would Houthi control of Bab al-Mandeb mean for the region? Read More » The capture of Mocha has strengthened the Houthi position around the vital sea passage that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The Institute for National Security Studies researcher, Yoel Guzansky, said simultaneous pressure on Saudi Arabia from Iran, the Houthis and militia groups in Iraq could open the way for “calm Israeli-Saudi security cooperation” involving intelligence, early warning and defence against missiles and drones, the report added. Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom said Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had sought assistance from regional countries and had made an indirect request to Israel through US Central Command. Riyadh had asked for help to stop the Houthis from blocking Bab al-Mandeb, it said. The report said Israel was unlikely to rush into an active military role because of concern that the Houthis could resume missile and drone attacks against Israel. Israeli media reported that the crisis could provide an opportunity for closer Saudi-Israeli security ties. Yemen’s battlefield On the ground, the situation has moved rapidly beyond the initial Houthi seizure of Mocha. Houthi forces had reached the strategic port after taking Hays and Al-Khawkhah districts and advancing through western Yemen. The Houthis have since announced the capture of Mayyun Island in Bab al-Mandeb, while government forces said they were carrying out air strikes against Houthi positions. UK considers military support for Saudis against Houthis, report says Read More » The renewed fighting has displaced nearly 86,000 people, the International Organization for Migration said on Sunday, after the figure rose by about 10,000 in a single day, with more than 2,000 reaching Djibouti by sea. The fighting, which has killed more than 500 fighters, has also spread into Saudi Arabia. On Sunday, the Houthis claimed that they had launched a ballistic missile and drone attack on a Saudi military base. Ansar Allah military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the attack targeted the Sharurah base in southern Saudi Arabia, including “weapons depots and command and control centres that are managing the aggression against our nation and people”. He said the strikes hit their targets and warned of bigger strikes deeper inside Saudi Arabia if attacks on Yemen continue. The Yemeni military said its air force had conducted three strikes against Houthi positions and barracks in the Taiz region. Al Jazeera described the Houthi advance as more than a temporary battlefield gain. Control of the Red Sea coast and nearby islands gives the group more ability to disrupt shipping, while exposing the weakness and divisions within Yemen’s internationally recognised government, it said. As the human toll of the war continues to rise, commercial traffic through Bab al-Mandeb has dropped to about 26 vessels per day from an average of about 70 before the Red Sea crisis. Yemen War News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

Military · Geopolitical

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UK considers military support for Saudis against Houthis, report says

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UK considers military support for Saudis against Houthis, report says Submitted by MEE staff on Tue, 09/15/2026 - 10:40 Britain is facing a heavy economic hit from the conflict in the Middle East Britain's Prime Minister Andy Burnham leaves from 10 Downing Street in central London on 1 September (AFP) Off The British government is reportedly considering helping Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in Yemen after the kingdom asked it for diplomatic and military support. Saudi Arabia asked Andy Burnham's government for operational support to help the Saudi military repel the Sanaa-based group's push south along Yemen's Red Sea coast toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and to defend against Houthi strikes, according to Bloomberg. Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, took over stretches of Yemen’s coast near the strait over the weekend, followed by attacks on the East-West Pipeline, which carries nearly four percent of the global oil supply. The Saudi government may need five to six weeks to repair damage from a drone attack on the pipeline, according to Reuters. Oil already soared last week as a result of a lightning Houthi offensive that put the group in control of Yemen’s side of the Bab el-Mandeb, a key Red Sea chokepoint for Saudi Arabian oil shipments. Britain is facing a heavy economic hit from the conflict in the Middle East triggered by the US - Israeli war on Iran. Burnham has reportedly been advised that if the Houthis control the Bab el-Mandeb strait, it will seriously impact international shipping, which could lead to energy prices soaring in Britain. Burnham is understood to have agreed to send British military advisors to Saudi Arabia to support its efforts. Houthi attacks expose gaps in Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia Read More » The UK has not commented on whether it will help Riyadh any further. Nor has the United States, which Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also reportedly asked for assistance. On Saturday, British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband spoke over the phone to Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan about the Houthi attacks. Miliband said: "The UK stands firmly with Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognised government of Yemen. " Saudi-led coalition air strikes in Yemen's southwestern Taiz province killed three people. The victims from Tuesday morning's attacks included two children, the Houthi-aligned al-Masirah TV station reported. Two others were wounded in the attacks. Meanwhile, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen said that 13 civilians were injured in Houthi attacks targeting the Saudi cities of Khamis Mushait, Abha and Taif on Monday. Pakistan and Turkey, which recently signed a joint defence agreement with Saudi Arabia, have not come to the country's aid over the Houthi attacks. According to a Turkish official, this is because the agreement has not yet become operational. UK Politics News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

Military · Geopolitical

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'Symbolic' UK sanctions on Israel aim to avoid Washington's wrath

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'Symbolic' UK sanctions on Israel aim to avoid Washington's wrath Submitted by Tom Blackburn on Sun, 09/13/2026 - 17:11 A more fundamental shift in policy, challenging Britain's long-held position as an underling of US imperialism, won't happen anytime soon Protesters hold a banner calling for sanctions against Israel during a demonstration in support of Palestinians in Gaza, outside Downing Street in London, on 29 July 2025 (Justin Tallis/AFP) Off Prime Minister Andy Burnham arrived in Downing Street promising to deliver change - and a break with the political and economic settlement that has prevailed in Britain since the late 1970s. That necessarily implied an indictment of his predecessor, Keir Starmer. Starmer himself came to power promising change, failed to deliver it, and ultimately paid with his political career. There were also hints that perhaps Burnham might take a different approach on the defining issue of Starmer’s failed premiership: Palestine. He offered an apology for Labour’s handling of Israel’s onslaught on Gaza, though stopped short of recognising it as a genocide - an implicit acknowledgment that Starmer’s support for Israel was not only morally indefensible, but had been politically highly damaging for the Labour Party. Certainly, there have been some signs of a change in approach and tone. Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband has announced a prohibition on British companies investing in illegal West Bank settlement projects, while Burnham has introduced a ban on goods imported from Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. So deranged and surreal are the times we live in that Mike Huckabee, US ambassador to Israel and Christian Zionist fanatic, this month accused Miliband (himself Jewish, of course) and the British government of “Jew hate”. Huckabee makes an unconvincing anti-antisemite, given that his own end-times worldview mandates that, upon the second coming, Jews must either convert to Christianity en masse or be smited. But Huckabee’s zealotry is beside the point. However bitterly the Trump administration and its representatives complain about the Burnham government’s supposed hostility towards Israel, the reality is that Britain continues to line up obediently behind the US and Israel when it actually matters. The political noise masks an underlying continuity. If anything, the incessant whining of US President Donald Trump and his acolytes flatters Burnham and Miliband. Litmus test As the investigative journalist Matt Kennard recently reported, since Burnham became prime minister, at least 10 military flights have travelled to Israel from Royal Air Force bases. Eight US KC-135 Stratotanker refuelling aircraft travelled to Israel from RAF Mildenhall, and a US C-17 transport plane from RAF Lakenheath, and an RAF A400M from Akrotiri, on Cyprus, flew to Tel Aviv. Despite being RAF bases, Mildenhall and Lakenheath are operated by the US Air Force; nevertheless, those flights would have required UK government authorisation. The UK government has explained the A400M flight as resupplying British embassy personnel, but there has been no comparable account for the others. While we don’t know what these aircraft were transporting, the A400M can carry up to 37 tonnes of cargo, including a Patriot missile system, helicopters or as many as six Land Rovers. Britain's settlement trade ban is cosmetic. For it to work, it must sanction Israel Read More » It is thus clear that RAF bases are being used, with the assent of the British government, to facilitate military traffic to Israel while it continues its assault on Gaza and accelerates the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, while also occupying large swathes of southern Lebanon, bombing and flattening villages there, and expelling their populations. Rhetoric or political gestures are one thing, but this is another. Under Starmer, of course, the RAF itself conducted hundreds of surveillance flights over Gaza, with British intelligence being passed on to Israel while it exterminated tens of thousands of Palestinians en masse, possibly more, thus directly implicating Britain in enabling Israel’s genocide. The litmus test of Burnham’s sincerity, then, is not whether he is prepared to introduce this or that sanction, or maybe make some critical remarks about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (even the most disingenuous liberal Zionist is prepared to do that). It is whether he is prepared to dismantle and end the practical cooperation between Britain and the genocidal Israeli regime. So far, the evidence available to us suggests far more continuity than rupture. None of this is to say that a ban on imports from illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories is not welcome, or that it represents no improvement on the status quo. But there is reason to question whether the announced ban would be effectively enforced. There is already a UK trade rule that bars goods produced on illegal settlements from receiving preferential tariff treatment. However, the Global Echo Litigation Center, a US non-profit, has threatened HM Revenue and Customs with legal action amid allegations that goods produced on settlements, mislabelled as Israeli, have been allowed into the UK tariff-free. If British authorities have failed to enforce rules already on the books, as alleged, the announcement of new restrictions has to be viewed with a sceptical eye. There must be rigorous enforcement and traceability, with meaningful penalties for any companies that try to circumvent the rules; otherwise, any such ban risks turning out to be far weaker in practice than the surrounding controversy might indicate. 'Special relationship' What would constitute more meaningful pressure on Israel? Cutting off military cooperation; ending the provision of intelligence; imposing a genuine arms embargo; blocking the use of RAF bases to facilitate supply flights to Israel; and imposing robust economic sanctions on the institutions and individuals enabling its genocide, theft of Palestinian land and ethnic cleansing of its people. Targeting the settlements alone, as if they somehow stood in isolation from the rest of Israel’s genocidal, settler-colonial project, is not enough. However, this is where the so-called “special relationship” kicks in. No wonder that UK diplomats have been keen to assure the White House that these new sanctions are 'largely symbolic' Britain’s military and intelligence apparatus, and its foreign policy establishment, are deeply integrated with the US. Britain’s role in the world since Suez has been that of a willing, if not obedient, junior partner in the US-led world order, especially in the Middle East. To do anything else would be looked on by Washington as insubordination, potentially incurring real economic and political costs for the UK. Trump, needless to say, is a particularly intolerant president. It is therefore no wonder that, as Bloomberg reports, UK diplomats have been keen to assure the White House that these new sanctions are “largely symbolic and will have no material impact on the UK’s wider relationship with Israel”. The ban on investment in and trade with West Bank settlements, provided it has some teeth, is still better than nothing. But a more fundamental shift in UK-Israel policy would amount to a challenge to Britain’s long-held position as an underling of US imperialism. Seriously confronting Israel means incurring the wrath of Washington. This is the third rail that Burnham will not touch. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. Israel's genocide in Gaza Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0

Military · Geopolitical

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Exclusive: Mali’s Tuareg separatists seek Turkey talks, reveal Russian contact

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Exclusive: Mali’s Tuareg separatists seek Turkey talks, reveal Russian contact Submitted by Levent Kemal on Mon, 09/14/2026 - 16:06 FLA spokesperson tells MEE that dialogue with the Africa Corps does not signal any rapprochement An Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) soldier stands near a damaged Mi-24 helicopter at the former Africa Corps barracks at Camp 2 in Kidal on 11 May 2026 (AFP) Off The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) in Mali has disclosed direct contacts with Russia’s Africa Corps and called for dialogue with Turkey to help find a political solution to the country’s crisis. In an exclusive interview with Middle East Eye, FLA spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane said the Tuareg separatist group hopes for engagement with Ankara, whose growing influence has made it an important player in the country. Currently, the FLA is fighting the Malian government alongside Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an alliance of armed groups aligned with al-Qaeda. While the two factions are coordinating their offensives, seizing towns and army bases, blockading Bamako and killing the Defence Minister Sadio Camara, they have different objectives: the FLA seeks an autonomous Tuareg state in Mali’s northeast while JNIM wants to topple the government. Previously, French and other western troops propped up the Malian state against JNIM and its precursors. But today, the government partners with Moscow, which deployed Wagner Group mercenaries in 2022, later reorganising them into Africa Corps units after Wagner’s mutiny against Vladimir Putin. An FLA/JNIM offensive in April exposed the vulnerabilities of that Russian deployment in the north. Africa Corps personnel withdrew from the strategic city of Kidal before the FLA seized it. And in July, reports emerged of possible arrangements between the FLA and Africa Corps amid fighting around Anefis, 100km southeast of Kidal. Ramadane said that the FLA have been in direct contact with the Africa Corps, but stressed that those exchanges did not amount to political negotiations or a strategic rapprochement. “I can confirm that there were direct contacts in certain contexts, notably around questions related to movements, withdrawals and the situation in certain areas,” he said. “In a conflict, there are sometimes channels of communication with the adversary to avoid incidents, manage certain situations or facilitate occasional arrangements,” he added. “This does not mean that the political objectives of the parties have become compatible. ” A message to Erdogan Ramadane insisted that northeastern Mali, the region the separatists want for an independent state they call Azawad, should not become an arena for a proxy war between foreign powers. Yet, he added, that should not prevent the FLA from seeking engagement with Turkey, which has deepened its diplomatic, economic and military ties with Bamako over the past decade. Ankara has sold armed drones and other equipment to Mali’s military government since 2023, while bilateral trade has tripled over the past decade. Defence has become an increasingly important part of that relationship: since 2024, arms and ammunition have accounted for 20 percent of Turkey’s exports to Mali, ahead of electronic equipment, industrial machinery and cereals, according to a report by Le Monde. Ramadane said those ties meant the FLA could not regard Ankara as standing entirely outside Mali’s conflict. “We note that Turkey has considerably developed its relations with the criminal junta in Bamako, particularly in the sale of drones,” he said, alleging that the aircraft were causing civilian deaths in Azawad. Nevertheless, he distinguished between Turkey’s relationship with Bamako and the role it could play in a political settlement. “We do not ask Turkey to break its relations with the military junta. We ask it to look at the Malian reality in all its complexity and not to consider the question of Azawad solely through the prism of the authorities in Bamako,” he said. A man walks past a structure damaged in a drone attack allegedly carried out by the Malian army near the Algerian border in Talhandak on 8 July 2026 (AFP) The FLA wanted channels of dialogue through which it could explain its position directly to Ankara and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he added, rather than via the Turkish military alone. Ramadane said the FLA’s appeals to Erdogan were not an attempt to recruit another foreign patron. “We do not ask Turkey to take a military side with the FLA. We ask it first to listen and understand,” he said. He argued that Turkey’s influence in Africa and the Muslim world, combined with its close relationship with Bamako, gave it a particular responsibility. “We do not ask Turkey to choose between Mali and Azawad. We ask it to contribute to ensuring that peace is not imposed on Azawad but negotiated with it,” Ramadane said. “Our essential message is this: we are not seeking foreign patrons for our cause, we are seeking partners capable of contributing to a just, lasting political solution consistent with the aspirations of the populations concerned. ” A Turkish official familiar with African affairs told MEE that Ankara was open to dialogue with a range of actors and that channels could be found if the FLA wanted to engage with the Turkish government. “However, it doesn’t mean that we will take their side and be part of the internal conflict of a foreign state,” the official said. “But we would listen to them. ” Battlefield cooperation with JNIM Alongside its appeal for dialogue with Turkey, the FLA defended its battlefield coordination with al-Qaeda-linked JNIM, saying it did not amount to a political alliance. Ramadane acknowledged that the groups had moved closer at an operational level against common enemies, but stressed that their political agendas remained fundamentally different. “It is first necessary to distinguish two things that are often deliberately confused: operational convergence on the ground and political alliance,” he said. In Mali, every foreign intervention failed - and jihadists adapted Read More » FLA and JNIM forces carried out coordinated attacks across northern and central Mali in April. A second coordinated offensive followed in July, including fighting around Anefis and attacks on military positions in Gao and Aguelhok. Ramadane said the cooperation reflected battlefield realities rather than a shared political programme, insisting that any lasting settlement must address Azawad’s political status. “The FLA remains an Azawadian political and military organisation whose project responds to the aspirations of the people of Azawad,” he said. “That being said, lasting peace in Mali and Azawad will necessarily have to take into account the realities on the ground. ” He argued that JNIM, which he described as now composed largely of Malian nationals, could not simply be excluded from a future settlement. “It is impossible to make peace in Mali or speak of stability without including JNIM,” he said, adding that the group was beginning to develop “a political language and an agenda of local demands”. Sahel Ragip Soylu News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

Military · Geopolitical

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Price of Fury: report details Iran war’s toll on US bases, weapons and more

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A US government watchdog released its first report on Monday on the impact of the Iran war, acknowledging the military’s advanced weapons shortfalls and offering the first public look at the damage to American aircraft, bases and diplomatic outposts in the Middle East. Much of the information has been previously reported over the past six months, but the Pentagon inspector general’s report offered the fullest official accounting so far of the conflict’s costs in American lives, taxpayer dollars...

Military · Geopolitical

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Why the Mecca defence pact hasn’t triggered action against the Houthis

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Why the Mecca defence pact hasn’t triggered action against the Houthis Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have faced criticism almost immediately after signing the Mecca joint defence agreement last month, with questions raised about the newly formed alliance’s lack of response to Houthi attacks launched from Yemen against Saudi Arabia. From the day after the signing ceremony, experts questioned whether Ankara would come to Riyadh’s aid as the Houthis targeted energy infrastructure and civilian areas in the kingdom. The group’s takeover of stretches of Yemen’s coast near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait over the weekend, followed by attacks on the East-West Pipeline, which carries nearly 4 percent of the global oil supply, intensified the controversy. However, judging the pact solely by the absence of an immediate joint military response overlooks several distinct questions: whether its defence obligations have entered into force, whether its members have built the mechanisms to implement them, and whether they are demonstrating sufficient political solidarity. A senior Turkish official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Middle East Eye that criticism portraying the alliance as already failing was disingenuous and intended to belittle it. Read more: Why the Mecca defence pact hasn’t triggered action against the Houthis

Military · Geopolitical

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Oil tanker has exploded in Strait of Hormuz, says Iran’s IRGC

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Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said late on Monday that an oil tanker had struck a sea mine and exploded in the Strait of Hormuz. The tanker El Gaia was travelling along the southern route through the strait, which was mined by Iran, state broadcaster IRIB reported, citing the IRGC. The entire vessel went up in flames following the detonation of the mine, it said. The US military rejected that account. “The Panama-flagged oil tanker El Gaia was struck by an Iranian missile last...

Military · Geopolitical

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Yemen: Fact-checking videos claiming to show Houthi rebel attacks

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A video claiming to show Houthi rebels ambushing Saudi-backed mercenaries has racked up major views on X. But the FRANCE 24 Observers found it is actually footage of 2024 Houthi military drills. The clip was edited with football commentary and blurred flags, which originally show Israel, the UK and US, not Saudi Arabia. Other viral videos falsely linked to Houthi attacks on a Saudi Aramco refinery were also traced to unrelated fires in Texas and Russia. Vedika Bahl fact-checks in Truth or Fake.

Military · Geopolitical

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Houthi attacks expose gaps in Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia

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Houthi attacks expose gaps in Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia After positioning itself as a regional mediator by facilitating talks between Washington and Tehran, Pakistan marked a major milestone in its expanding diplomacy last month: the signing of a trilateral defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey in Islam’s holiest city. Signed in Mecca on 7 August, the Joint Defence Agreement states that an attack on one signatory will be treated as an attack on all, drawing immediate comparisons to Nato’s Article 5, even as analysts cautioned against taking the clause too literally. That commitment was quickly tested on 8 September, when Iran-backed Houthi forces launched a massive drone and missile barrage into Saudi Arabia, striking critical military and energy infrastructure. Overnight, an abstract commitment turned into a high-stakes operational question. Neither Islamabad nor Ankara launched military counter-operations alongside Riyadh, choosing firm diplomatic statements instead. Read more: Houthi attacks expose gaps in Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia Left to right: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posing after signing the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 7 August 2026 (Handout/Pakistan prime minister's office/AFP)

Military · Geopolitical

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Houthi attacks expose gaps in Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia

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Houthi attacks expose gaps in Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia Submitted by Zia Ur Rehman on Mon, 09/14/2026 - 20:27 The attacks are the first test and have revealed some distance between the Mecca agreement’s promise of collective defence and allies’ lack of military plans Left to right: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posing after signing the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 7 August 2026 (Handout/Pakistan prime minister's office/AFP) Off After positioning itself as a regional mediator by facilitating talks between Washington and Tehran, Pakistan marked a major milestone in its expanding diplomacy last month: the signing of a trilateral defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey in Islam’s holiest city. Signed in Mecca on 7 August, the Joint Defence Agreement states that an attack on one signatory will be treated as an attack on all, drawing immediate comparisons to Nato’s Article 5, even as analysts cautioned against taking the clause too literally. That commitment was quickly tested on 8 September, when Iran-backed Houthi forces launched a massive drone and missile barrage into Saudi Arabia, striking critical military and energy infrastructure. Overnight, an abstract commitment turned into a high-stakes operational question. Neither Islamabad nor Ankara launched military counter-operations alongside Riyadh, choosing firm diplomatic statements instead. For Pakistan, the dilemma is a serious one: how can Islamabad honour its security commitments to Saudi Arabia without being dragged into a wider Middle Eastern war? Immediately after the Houthis’ attack, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif told the media that Pakistan is “bound by the terms and conditions of this pact, and we will honour them in case there is a need”. However, foreign ministry spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan clarified that direct military action against the Houthis was not under active discussion. “Pakistan has signed a joint defence agreement, which is a fact... But as of now, there is no discussion of this kind,” he said on 10 September, during his weekly media briefing in Islamabad. This response exposes a widening gap between political solidarity and direct military action, leaving Pakistan balancing its Saudi alliance against delicate ties with neighbouring Iran. Pakistan walks a tightrope Pakistan has a longstanding military presence in Saudi Arabia and has deepened defence cooperation with Riyadh considerably in recent years. Under a separate bilateral defence framework - the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, signed in September 2025 - Saudi authorities in April confirmed the arrival of Pakistani troops, including fighter and support aircraft from the Pakistan Air Force, at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the kingdom amid rising regional tensions, to “support regional and international security and stability”. Pakistan says no plans for military action in Yemen after attacks on Saudi Arabia Read More » But there is a fundamental difference between helping Saudi Arabia protect its territory and infrastructure and joining an offensive campaign against the Houthis inside Yemen. One Pakistani official familiar with Gulf affairs described the emerging position as a repeat, in some respects, of Islamabad’s dilemma in 2015. In that instance, the Pakistani Parliament voted to remain neutral rather than join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, a decision that severely strained ties with Riyadh. Experts familiar with the developments said that both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia appear determined to avoid being drawn into a wider regional war. Qamar Cheema, head of the Islamabad-based Sanober Institute think tank, said neither country wanted the conflict involving Israel, the US and Iran to spill over into Saudi territory. “This alliance will fight with state actors and work as a deterrent and a clear case of strategic depth, which Saudi Arabia is searching for,” Cheema told MEE, adding that Saudi Arabia wants to avoid a repeat of the crisis facing the Strait of Hormuz. Maintaining this fine line between static defensive support and active military participation may prove increasingly difficult if Houthi missile strikes escalate further. The Houthi factor The situation for Pakistan remains volatile and largely tied to Houthi activity. A new geopolitical crisis has erupted along the Bab el-Mandab Strait after the Houthis announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia in July, invoking a strategy they term “blockade for blockade”. 'This alliance will fight with state actors and work as a deterrent and a clear case of strategic depth' - Qamar Cheema, Sanober Institute The move came as a direct response to Saudi-imposed restrictions on Houthi-controlled infrastructure, and followed an escalation that saw strikes on Sanaa Airport alongside drone and missile launches targeting Saudi air facilities. According to the Pakistani official, Riyadh has concluded that political negotiations with the Houthis are no longer viable, forcing the kingdom to prepare for an extended military engagement. Pakistan joined the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance, launched on 30 July at a meeting in Riyadh attended by military representatives from more than 40 countries. Fourteen countries, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan, backed the initiative to protect shipping lanes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Beyond this, Pakistan actively participates in regional maritime security operations through US-led Combined Task Force 150, a multinational naval coalition operating in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandab Strait. The immediate priority for Pakistan appears to be avoiding escalation. “If Houthi missile strikes escalate further or result in mass casualties among Pakistani personnel stationed at strategic sites in Saudi Arabia, public and political pressure in Islamabad could force the government’s hand [to act],” the Pakistani official warned. That possibility could turn the current ambiguity into a direct test of the trilateral pact. Cheema said attacking the Houthis was not an option for Pakistan at this stage. Having positioned itself as a peacemaker, he said, Islamabad was “seeking to use dialogue to help contain the crisis, particularly as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the potential disruption of the Gulf of Aden could put other vital maritime routes and global supply chains at risk”. The Iran factor For Pakistan, the most complex element in this strategic equation is Iran. Sharing a porous 900-kilometre border, both nations routinely seek to contain friction, especially after exchanging cross-border missile strikes in January 2024. A Pakistani offensive against the Houthis would risk reigniting direct conflict with Tehran, the group’s primary backer, though the nature and extent of its support remain contested. Qatar and Pakistan carry Trump’s message to Iran: He won't return to the MoU Read More » Directly engaging an Iranian proxy could severely strain bilateral ties and create new security pressures along Pakistan’s western frontier, experts fear. Domestic stability adds further complexity. Pakistan hosts one of the world’s largest Shia populations outside Iran, many of whom look to Tehran for religious guidance under the Wilayat-e Faqih doctrine. Though Pakistan's military leadership managed internal unrest in the country following violence after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s killing in US-Israeli air strikes on Iran on 28 February, sectarian sensitivities remain an ever-present constraint whenever relations with Tehran sour. Economic fallout also poses an immediate threat. Pakistan relies heavily on Middle Eastern energy and critical shipping corridors like the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Regional instability can rapidly spill over into domestic markets; recent Middle East hostilities triggered an abrupt spike in domestic fuel prices within a single week. Three countries, three security priorities The alliance also faces a deeper problem: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey do not share identical threat perceptions. Pakistan’s principal military concern remains India, with tensions with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime over cross-border militancy adding another layer to its security calculations. Saudi Arabia’s priorities are different. Riyadh is primarily concerned with protecting its territory, energy infrastructure and maritime routes while managing threats from Iran and armed non-state groups, such as the Houthis, particularly along its southern frontier. Turkey has an even broader security perimeter, extending across Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus. These divergent priorities raise a fundamental question: would each member be prepared to incur major economic and geopolitical costs to defend another against a conflict that it does not regard as its own? This operational friction is further compounded by disparate military hardware platforms across the three armies. Saudi Arabia depends heavily on sophisticated western and US-supplied defence platforms. Pakistan operates a large inventory of Chinese-origin systems alongside western equipment, while Turkey has invested heavily in its indigenous defence industry. An alliance still taking shape The trilateral arrangement itself remains a work in progress. Ministers and military officials from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey met in Istanbul on 31 August to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and pledge cooperation on defence technology. Why the Mecca defence pact hasn’t triggered action against the Houthis Read More » But experts say the pact is still a general framework rather than an integrated military command. Specifics of the pact, including air defence assistance, intelligence sharing, and protection of Saudi military installations or naval operations, are yet to be seen, as well as the question of participation in offensive operations against the Houthis. “A lot of institutional development is required at the moment, particularly in inter-military planning and interoperability among the armed forces of the three countries,” Cheema said. The countries also need to establish clear procedures for responding to threats from both state and non-state actors, he said. Khan, Pakistan’s foreign ministry spokesman, acknowledged the limitations last week, describing the pact as an “umbrella agreement” whose institutional mechanisms would take time to develop. “At this stage, I don’t think we should be discussing this topic in the context of its operationalisation,” he told journalists. War on Iran Islamabad News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

Military · Geopolitical

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'Axis of Iranian centrality' remains "one of more destabilising forces in the region", expert says

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Yemen's Houthis launched a fresh barrage of missile and drone attacks on Saudi military targets on Monday, as Iran denied any involvement in the country's revived civil war. Speaking with FRANCE 24's Mark Owen, Dr H. Hellyer, Senior Fellow in Geopolitics, International Security, and Middle East Studies at the Royal United Services Institute, says that Iran and its non-state proxies "remain to be one of the more destabilising forces in the region alongside the Israeli project of regional paramountcy".

Military · Geopolitical

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Saudi Arabia has struck Yemen around fifty times in 24 hours, Houthis say

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Saudi Arabia has struck Yemen around fifty times in 24 hours, Houthis say Houthi fighters claimed on Monday that Saudi Arabia had carried out 54 strikes towards Yemen in 24 hours, as the movement had inflicted significant setbacks on Yemeni government forces and their Saudi ally in recent days. "The Saudi criminal aviation carried out 54 airstrikes in the past 24 hours using F-15 and Typhoon aircraft that took off from Saudi bases," said Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree, specifying that the regions of Taiz, Lahj, Al-Jawf, Marib and Hodeida had been targeted.

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