Ali al-Taher: What Israel’s 'operational control' of the hill really means for Hezbollah and Lebanon
Ali al-Taher: What Israel’s 'operational control' of the hill really means for Hezbollah and Lebanon Submitted by Adam Chamseddine on Wed, 09/09/2026 - 12:52 Hezbollah's withdrawal from the strategic ridge may ultimately prove less important than what will now happen around it Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli strikes that targeted the hilltops of the mountainous area of the strategic Ali al-Taher Ridge, in the Nabatieh district, Lebanon, on 14 August 2026 (AFP) Off For months, the south Lebanon hill of Ali al-Taher was treated by Hezbollah as an exception to a strategy it had otherwise adopted since the beginning of the war with Israel on 2 March: avoid fighting to hold fixed geographical positions at all costs.
The shift reflected lessons drawn from the 2024 war, when Hezbollah's attempt to maintain front-line positions produced heavy casualties without preventing Israel from penetrating parts of southern Lebanon.
An official familiar with the group's thinking said that the experience, including the prolonged fighting around towns such as Khiam, pushed Hezbollah towards a more flexible guerrilla strategy, in which fighters would avoid being tied to territory and instead preserve their ability to operate after Israeli advances.
Even Bint Jbeil in April, long portrayed as the “mother of all battles”, was not regarded internally as a position that had to be held to the last fighter. Ali al-Taher was different.
In June, shortly before the ceasefire took effect, a Hezbollah official told Middle East Eye that the hill would be defended “until the last man” rather than surrendered.
He described the position as being of exceptional strategic importance, while stressing that “tactics and strategy change according to the circumstances” and that his comments reflected the conditions of the full-scale war then being fought.
The distinction is key to understanding what happened next. Ali al-Taher is not simply another piece of high ground.
The ridge overlooking Nabatieh and the Iqlim al-Tuffah area, roughly 15 kilometres from the Israeli border and rising to about 600 metres, commands important roads and approaches across southern Lebanon.
The ridge is suspected of containing Hezbollah underground command and weapons facilities, while Israeli forces have said they found underground routes and military infrastructure beneath it.
Potential shift in the threat’s direction According to the Hezbollah official, the strategic value of Ali al-Taher came from three interconnected factors: the underground facilities beneath the ridge, their links to other strategic underground positions, and the geographical advantage provided by the hill itself.
Its loss last week, he argued, would allow Israel to reverse the direction of the military threat: rather than Hezbollah using the territory north of the Litani river to threaten northern Israel, Israeli forces would gain a position from which they could exert pressure and surveillance over the Nabatieh and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas.
Israeli strikes kill 11 in southern Lebanese village, including two infants Read More » That calculation explains why Hezbollah continued to fight around the ridge after the June ceasefire, even as it had largely moved away from defending fixed positions elsewhere.
Ali al-Taher remained the scene of daily Israeli strikes and Hezbollah drone attacks for weeks after the ceasefire, while the United States had proposed that Hezbollah hand the position over to the Lebanese army as part of a broader disarmament arrangement.
The battle subsequently became a prolonged contest of attrition.
Israel maintained aerial and operational surveillance over the ridge, repeatedly striking the area while gradually tightening pressure around the underground complex.
In August, Israeli officials were publicly discussing expanded air and ground operations around Ali al-Taher, with Israeli reporting claiming that Hezbollah fighters remained inside tunnels beneath the ridge.
A strategic defeat for Hezbollah? Yet, the Hezbollah official argues that the significance of the group’s withdrawal cannot be reduced to Israel’s claim that it now controls the hill.
“The hill stood for nearly three months with total aerial and operational oversight from Israel, constantly bombarded, and yet our men stood their ground,” he said.
'The hill stood for nearly three months with total aerial and operational oversight from Israel, constantly bombarded, and yet our men stood their ground' - Hezbollah official The eventual decision to withdraw, he added, was a cost-benefit assessment, rather than an abandonment of the strategic importance of the position.
This distinction has become particularly relevant since Israel announced on 3 September that it had established “operational control” over Ali al-Taher.
The Israeli military said its forces had cleared Hezbollah fighters from two underground routes and established control both above and below ground.
Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz subsequently presented the move as the consolidation of Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon.
However, “operational control” is not necessarily synonymous with uncontested or permanent occupation.
Hezbollah has not officially commented on the claim, but members of the group denied it the following day, saying there was no Israeli military presence on the ridge and that its fighters remained deployed in the area and prepared to confront any attempt to advance.
The dispute over terminology therefore matters.
Israel has demonstrated the ability to operate on and beneath the ridge, while Hezbollah is seeking to deny that this automatically translates into a decisive strategic defeat. What next?
The question now is what Israel does with that advantage.
Israeli officials have said they intend to remain in their security zone until Hezbollah is disarmed, turning Ali al-Taher into more than a battlefield achievement: it is now part of Israel's negotiating leverage over Lebanon.
For Hezbollah, meanwhile, the challenge is to absorb the loss of a strategically valuable position without allowing it to become a wider erosion of its military posture north of the Litani.
The party's response is likely to depend less on attempting to immediately retake the hill than on whether Israel can use it as a platform to penetrate or dominate the surrounding strategic terrain.
Israeli forces reportedly use phosphorus shells in attacks on southern Lebanon Read More » The Hezbollah official stressed that Ali al-Taher remains overlooked by other strategic hills that the party controls, arguing that Israel's ability to enter the ridge and reverse the threat towards areas north of the Litani is “another matter” for both Hezbollah and Iran.
That points towards the central question of the next phase: does Ali al-Taher's loss remain a contained tactical setback, or does Israel turn control of the ridge into a broader military and political advantage?
The answer will depend on whether Israel can consolidate its positions, neutralise the underground infrastructure and use the ridge to constrain Hezbollah's freedom of movement, while Hezbollah attempts to demonstrate that its withdrawal from one strategic position does not amount to the collapse of its wider military network.
Recent reporting already suggests that the contest has not ended with Israel's announcement.
Israeli strikes around Nabatieh have continued, while reports of Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in the area have persisted.
In that sense, Ali al-Taher may ultimately prove less important for what happened on the hill than for what happens around it.
Its “operational control” by Israel marks the end of a months-long battle over one of Hezbollah's most important fixed positions.
But whether it marks a strategic defeat for Hezbollah, the beginning of a new Israeli push north of the Litani, or simply another stage in the transition from conventional front-line warfare to a more dispersed confrontation remains unresolved.
The hill has changed hands in the military sense claimed by Israel; the larger contest over the terrain, the underground network and the future security architecture of southern Lebanon has not.
Israel's war on Lebanon Nabatieh, Lebanon What Israel’s 'operational control' of strategic hill really means for Hezbollah and Lebanon News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0
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Primary source: Middle East Eye
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