Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Japan marks Nagasaki bombing anniversary as nuclear debate rattles pacificists

S9

The Japanese city of Nagasaki on Sunday marked the 81st anniversary of the US atomic bombing with a ceremony at the Peace Park memorial. It came as Japanese Minister Sanae Takaichi ’s government has opened a debate on the country's postwar non-nuclear principles amid increasing doubts over the reliability of the US security umbrella as China flexs its military muscles in the region.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Israeli troops enter Lebanese village, erect earthen barrier overnight

S9

Israeli troops enter Lebanese village, erect earthen barrier overnight Israeli troops infiltrated a Lebanese village placed under the control of Lebanon's army as part of a June agreement, building an earthen barrier there overnight. An AFP correspondent saw the barrier, situated at the village's eastern entrance and blocking the road. The local authorities said it was unclear if any Israeli forces remained in the area. "An Israeli occupation army force advanced into the village of Zawtar al-Gharbiya shortly after midnight... and erected a new earthen barrier near the town square," Lebanon's state-run National News Agency (NNA) reported. Zawtar al-Gharbiya was one of two designated "pilot zones" where the Lebanese army was to take over as part of a US-sponsored framework agreement signed with Israel. Contacted by AFP, the Israeli military said it was "not aware of such an event in this area". Israeli forces continue to occupy a broad band of territory in the south along the border. Its invasion and widespread bombing campaign have killed more than 4,300 people and displaced hundreds of thousands more. (AFP) (Reporting by AFP) A mound of dirt put into place by the Israeli military blocks the eastern entrance of the Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah on 8 August 2026.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Iran sets conditions for reopening Strait of Hormuz

S9

Iran sets conditions for reopening Strait of Hormuz Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, has outlined Tehran’s conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. In a statement carried by Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB, Zolghadr said Washington must “correct its behaviour” by: Ending threats against Iran and its “sacred values” Permanently halting military action against Iran and its regional allies Withdrawing US naval and air forces involved in the blockade of Iran Compensating Iran for damage inflicted during the recent conflict Lifting US sanctions Releasing frozen Iranian assets “The Supreme National Security Council will not retreat from these demands, whether in war or in negotiations,” Zolghadr said.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Three Palestinians killed and dozens wounded in Israeli attacks across Gaza and West Bank

S9

Three Palestinians killed and dozens wounded in Israeli attacks across Gaza and West Bank Submitted by MEE staff on Sat, 08/08/2026 - 20:56 Jewish settlers opened fire and vandalised Palestinian property as Israeli forces raided homes, towns and a mosque across the West Bank A mourner carries the shrouded body of an infant killed in an overnight Israeli airstrike the Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on August 2, 2026. (Omar Al Qattaa/AFP) Off Three Palestinians were killed in Israeli attacks on Gaza, while Israeli forces and Jewish settlers wounded dozens more across the occupied West Bank on Saturday. In the West Bank city of Tubas, Israeli forces stormed the city with military vehicles and deployed soldiers through the centre. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society treated 15 people after troops fired tear gas at residents. Israeli forces also raided al Mughayyir, northeast of Ramallah, and fired tear gas inside a house, leaving members of a family, including children, struggling to breathe. Troops entered the nearby town of Turmus Ayya and the village of Abu Falah, while another Israeli force raided Kobar and fired tear gas in its streets. Further south, Israeli settlers opened fire during an attack on Wadi al-Rakhim in Masafer Yatta, wounding four Palestinians. Medical workers took a 57-year-old man to hospital after a bullet struck his hand. Settlers, operating under the protection of Israeli forces, also attacked the area surrounding the Prophet Saleh Mosque in Idhna, west of Hebron. They assaulted residents, fired live ammunition and erected a tent on privately owned Palestinian land. 'Used as human bait': Leaked image shows elderly Palestinian men before execution by Israeli forces Read More » Israeli soldiers entered the mosque during the settler assault and detained seven worshippers, including its imam, Mu’taz Sa’di Tmaizi. Troops fired bullets, stun grenades and tear gas during the raid, while settlers vandalised a Palestinian vehicle. Settlers also attacked Abu Falah and fired near the village school. Separate groups entered Beit Ur al-Tahta and roamed Palestinian farmland outside Jaljalia as Israeli forces provided protection. The violence extended to Gaza, where Israeli troops shot three Palestinians in northern Khan Younis killing one. Nasser Medical Complex received the wounded. Gaza’s Health Ministry said two more Palestinians had died from wounds sustained in previous Israeli attacks. Hospitals also received six wounded people, bringing the toll since the start of the genocide in October 2023 to 73,384 killed and 174,242 wounded. Israel has killed 1,257 Palestinians and wounded 4,131 others since the October 2025 ceasefire took effect. Occupation News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Turkey and Saudi Arabia: From bitter rivals to strategic partners

S9

Turkey and Saudi Arabia: From bitter rivals to strategic partners Submitted by Rayhan Uddin on Sat, 08/08/2026 - 14:44 As Riyadh and Ankara sign a historic defence agreement with Pakistan, MEE charts the turbulent ties between the two powers under Erdogan and Mohammed bin Salman Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is received by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 7 August 2026 (Saudi Press Agency/Handout via Reuters) Off In a highly symbolic move, the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Turkey were pictured performing Friday prayers together this week in the holy city of Mecca. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud were joined at the holiest site in Islam by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. For years, Ankara and Riyadh have been moving closer together and mending previously turbulent relations. That process was further solidified in recent days after Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a historic joint defence agreement. The agreement brings the three Muslim powers under a single security umbrella for the first time as part of a trilateral framework. While Pakistan has maintained close ties with both countries for decades, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have not always seen eye to eye. From historical rivalries over territory and religious sites to periods of cordial relations and a rupture over the killing of a journalist, Middle East Eye takes a brief look at the history of relations between the two countries. Sunni muslim powers There has long been low-level tension between Riyadh and Ankara over their competing claims to leadership of the Sunni Muslim world, dating back to the establishment of both states in the early 20th century. The House of Saud fought the Ottoman Empire during the Ottoman-Saudi war in the 19th century, with the Saudis taking control of swathes of territory before a brutal crackdown by the Ottoman rulers. After the fall of the Ottoman dynasty following the Arab revolt in 1916, the Saudis defeated local rivals and took control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina by 1924. Footage: Saudi Crown Prince MbS, Erdogan and Sharif together perform Friday prayers in Mecca pic. twitter. com/tsVx6yV5Nt — Ragıp Soylu (@ragipsoylu) August 7, 2026 The Ottomans had controlled Islam's two holiest sites almost continuously for more than 350 years. The nascent states of Saudi Arabia and Turkey formally established relations in the 1930s, and the two countries remained cordial for many decades. Both supported Iraq during the Iran - Iraq war, though Riyadh did so more openly, and both supported the US during the Gulf war. Tensions occasionally simmered over Islamic cultural heritage, with Turkey long criticising the demolition of Ottoman sites, including fortresses, cemeteries and railways, in Saudi Arabia. In 2002, the Turkish culture ministry condemned the Saudi demolition of the then 220-year-old al-Ajyad fortress, which overlooks the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Murat Sokmenoglu, then Turkey’s parliament speaker, called it “sinful behaviour in breach of the moral values of Islam”. Riyadh defended the decision, stating that it was exercising its sovereignty and using the site to house pilgrims in Mecca. The Clock Tower in Mecca, one of the world’s tallest buildings, was later built on the site. Arab Spring divergence Cordial relations, punctuated by occasional minor disputes, gave way to much deeper disagreements following the Arab Spring in 2010. Although both countries supported the overthrow of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad in Syria, their wider approach to revolutionary movements in the region diverged. In Egypt, Turkey supported Mohamed Morsi - the first democratically elected president - and strongly opposed the 2013 military coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a friend and ally of Riyadh. Following the coup, Turkey was welcoming of Egypt’s opposition, allowing dissenting media platforms to base themselves on Turkish soil. What Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East Read More » For years, Erdogan refused to recognise Sisi’s rule and called for the release of 65,000 political prisoners. Ankara and Riyadh diverged in other arenas too. In 2017, when Saudi Arabia (alongside the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt) imposed a blockade on Qatar, accusing it of meddling in regional countries and supporting terrorism, Turkey sided with Doha. Meanwhile, in Libya, following the fragmentation of power after the 2011 revolution, Ankara supported the internationally recognised government in Tripoli, while Riyadh initially aligned itself with eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar. A war of words between Riyadh and Ankara came to a head in early 2018, when Mohammed bin Salman said Turkey was part of a “triangle of evil” alongside Iran and extremist religious groups. Khashoggi killing Ties between the two hit their lowest in modern times later that year following the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Khashoggi, a former MEE journalist, was murdered by Saudi agents at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. Turkish prosecutors later indicted 20 Saudis over the killing, based on an analysis of the suspects’ mobile phone records, records of their entry into and exit from Turkey, their presence at the consulate, witness statements, and an examination of Khashoggi's phone, laptop and iPad. Erdogan said the killing was ordered at the "highest levels" of the Saudi government. Turkey’s state broadcaster and news agency were blocked in Saudi Arabia in 2010, and Ankara responded by blocking Saudi and Emirati news websites. Riyadh also launched an unofficial boycott of Turkish goods, causing Turkey’s exports to the Gulf kingdom to drop 92 percent year on year in 2021. The Saudi government had systematically pressured local businesses not to trade with Turkish companies and to drop their goods from their shelves. Regional rapprochement The two countries ended their long-simmering rift in 2022 as part of a wider period of rapprochement in the region. Mohammed bin Salman visited Ankara in June that year for the first time since Khashoggi’s killing. He met Erdogan at the presidential palace, where the two countries agreed to deepen cooperation on monetary policy, defence, energy and tourism. Bab al-Mandeb: US war on Iran gives Houthis new leverage over Saudi Arabia Read More » The meeting came after a Turkish court transferred the Khashoggi murder case to Saudi Arabia, meeting a key demand from the Gulf kingdom for mending ties. The reconciliation came amid a wider regional shift towards rapprochement led by the Saudi crown prince. That included ending the three and a half year rift with Qatar, seeking to engage with the Houthis in Yemen, as well as restoring diplomatic relations with Iran following a China -brokered agreement. At the same time, Ankara, for its part, restored fractured relations with Egypt and the UAE, At a time when Turkey was dealing with a fragile economy and a massive slump in its currency, ending its rifts with oil-rich Gulf states was seen as key to economic stabilisation. Since patching up ties, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have signed deals on technology, defence and renewable energy. In the summer of 2023, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy Turkish drones in the biggest defence contract in Turkey's history. Aligning goals More recently, Turkey and Saudi Arabia appear to be coming closer together due to a shared understanding over events in neighbouring countries. In Syria, both Riyadh and Ankara support the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and are among Damascus’ closest allies. Why are Kurdish groups in Iraq being attacked amid the US-Iran flare-up? Read More » Both countries were involved in lobbying for the US to lift sanctions on Syria. In Libya, while they had at times backed rival camps, they now both appear to support the internationally recognised government. Meanwhile in war-torn Sudan, Riyadh and Ankara both support the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The UAE is the main backer of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Somalia is another arena where Turkey and Saudi Arabia find themselves on one side and Abu Dhabi on the other. Ankara and Riyadh stand firmly behind the central government, while the UAE has steadily supported Somaliland’s efforts to gain international recognition. Rather than Qatar or Turkey, it now seems that Saudis growing rift is with its erstwhile Gulf ally, the UAE. Those tensions came to a head publicly for the first time in Yemen in late December. Ankara appears increasingly aligned with Riyadh amid those tensions, although it is unlikely to take sides publicly because of its strong financial ties with Abu Dhabi. Diplomacy News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Turkey and Saudi Arabia: From bitter rivals to strategic partners

S9

Turkey and Saudi Arabia: From bitter rivals to strategic partners Submitted by Rayhan Uddin on Sat, 08/08/2026 - 14:44 As Riyadh and Ankara sign a historic defence agreement with Pakistan, MEE charts the turbulent ties between the two powers under Erdogan and Mohammed bin Salman Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is received by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 7 August 2026 (Saudi Press Agency/Handout via Reuters) Off In a highly symbolic move, the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Turkey were pictured performing Friday prayers together this week in the holy city of Mecca. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud were joined at the holiest site in Islam by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. For years, Ankara and Riyadh have been moving closer together and mending previously turbulent relations. That process was further solidified in recent days after Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a historic joint defence agreement. The agreement brings the three Muslim powers under a single security umbrella for the first time as part of a trilateral framework. While Pakistan has maintained close ties with both countries for decades, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have not always seen eye to eye. From historical rivalries over territory and religious sites to periods of cordial relations and a rupture over the killing of a journalist, Middle East Eye takes a brief look at the history of relations between the two countries. Sunni muslim powers There has long been low-level tension between Riyadh and Ankara over their competing claims to leadership of the Sunni Muslim world, dating back to the establishment of both states in the early 20th century. The House of Saud fought the Ottoman Empire during the Ottoman-Saudi war in the 19th century, with the Saudis taking control of swathes of territory before a brutal crackdown by the Ottoman rulers. After the fall of the Ottoman dynasty following the Arab revolt in 1916, the Saudis defeated local rivals and took control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina by 1924. Footage: Saudi Crown Prince MbS, Erdogan and Sharif together perform Friday prayers in Mecca pic. twitter. com/tsVx6yV5Nt — Ragıp Soylu (@ragipsoylu) August 7, 2026 The Ottomans had controlled Islam's two holiest sites almost continuously for more than 350 years. The nascent states of Saudi Arabia and Turkey formally established relations in the 1930s, and the two countries remained cordial for many decades. Both supported Iraq during the Iran - Iraq war, though Riyadh did so more openly, and both supported the US during the Gulf war. Tensions occasionally simmered over Islamic cultural heritage, with Turkey long criticising the demolition of Ottoman sites, including fortresses, cemeteries and railways, in Saudi Arabia. In 2002, the Turkish culture ministry condemned the Saudi demolition of the then 220-year-old al-Ajyad fortress, which overlooks the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Murat Sokmenoglu, then Turkey’s parliament speaker, called it “sinful behaviour in breach of the moral values of Islam”. Riyadh defended the decision, stating that it was exercising its sovereignty and using the site to house pilgrims in Mecca. The Clock Tower in Mecca, one of the world’s tallest buildings, was later built on the site. Arab Spring divergence Cordial relations, punctuated by occasional minor disputes, gave way to much deeper disagreements following the Arab Spring in 2010. Although both countries supported the overthrow of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad in Syria, their wider approach to revolutionary movements in the region diverged. In Egypt, Turkey supported Mohamed Morsi - the first democratically elected president - and strongly opposed the 2013 military coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a friend and ally of Riyadh. Following the coup, Turkey was welcoming of Egypt’s opposition, allowing dissenting media platforms to base themselves on Turkish soil. What Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East Read More » For years, Erdogan refused to recognise Sisi’s rule and called for the release of 65,000 political prisoners. Ankara and Riyadh diverged in other arenas too. In 2017, when Saudi Arabia (alongside the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt) imposed a blockade on Qatar, accusing it of meddling in regional countries and supporting terrorism, Turkey sided with Doha. Meanwhile, in Libya, following the fragmentation of power after the 2011 revolution, Ankara supported the internationally recognised government in Tripoli, while Riyadh initially aligned itself with eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar. A war of words between Riyadh and Ankara came to a head in early 2018, when Mohammed bin Salman said Turkey was part of a “triangle of evil” alongside Iran and extremist religious groups. Khashoggi killing Ties between the two hit their lowest in modern times later that year following the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Khashoggi, a former MEE journalist, was murdered by Saudi agents at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. Turkish prosecutors later indicted 20 Saudis over the killing, based on an analysis of the suspects’ mobile phone records, records of their entry into and exit from Turkey, their presence at the consulate, witness statements, and an examination of Khashoggi's phone, laptop and iPad. Erdogan said the killing was ordered at the "highest levels" of the Saudi government. Turkey’s state broadcaster and news agency were blocked in Saudi Arabia in 2010, and Ankara responded by blocking Saudi and Emirati news websites. Riyadh also launched an unofficial boycott of Turkish goods, causing Turkey’s exports to the Gulf kingdom to drop 92 percent year on year in 2021. The Saudi government had systematically pressured local businesses not to trade with Turkish companies and to drop their goods from their shelves. Regional rapprochement The two countries ended their long-simmering rift in 2022 as part of a wider period of rapprochement in the region. Mohammed bin Salman visited Ankara in June that year for the first time since Khashoggi’s killing. He met Erdogan at the presidential palace, where the two countries agreed to deepen cooperation on monetary policy, defence, energy and tourism. Bab al-Mandeb: US war on Iran gives Houthis new leverage over Saudi Arabia Read More » The meeting came after a Turkish court transferred the Khashoggi murder case to Saudi Arabia, meeting a key demand from the Gulf kingdom for mending ties. The reconciliation came amid a wider regional shift towards rapprochement led by the Saudi crown prince. That included ending the three and a half year rift with Qatar, seeking to engage with the Houthis in Yemen, as well as restoring diplomatic relations with Iran following a China -brokered agreement. At the same time, Ankara, for its part, restored fractured relations with Egypt and the UAE, At a time when Turkey was dealing with a fragile economy and a massive slump in its currency, ending its rifts with oil-rich Gulf states was seen as key to economic stabilisation. Since patching up ties, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have signed deals on technology, defence and renewable energy. In the summer of 2023, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy Turkish drones in the biggest defence contract in Turkey's history. Aligning goals More recently, Turkey and Saudi Arabia appear to be coming closer together due to a shared understanding over events in neighbouring countries. In Syria, both Riyadh and Ankara support the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and are among Damascus’ closest allies. Why are Kurdish groups in Iraq being attacked amid the US-Iran flare-up? Read More » Both countries were involved in lobbying for the US to lift sanctions on Syria. In Libya, while they had at times backed rival camps, they now both appear to support the internationally recognised government. Meanwhile in war-torn Sudan, Riyadh and Ankara both support the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The UAE is the main backer of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Somalia is another arena where Turkey and Saudi Arabia find themselves on one side and Abu Dhabi on the other. Ankara and Riyadh stand firmly behind the central government, while the UAE has steadily supported Somaliland’s efforts to gain international recognition. Rather than Qatar or Turkey, it now seems that Saudis growing rift is with its erstwhile Gulf ally, the UAE. Those tensions came to a head publicly for the first time in Yemen in late December. Ankara appears increasingly aligned with Riyadh amid those tensions, although it is unlikely to take sides publicly because of its strong financial ties with Abu Dhabi. Diplomacy News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Saudi, Turkey, Pakistan pact comes amid US-Iran war fallout

S9

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed a mutual defence pact on Friday that would treat any act of aggression on one of the three nations as an attack on all of them, the allies said in a joint statement. However, it did not specify if the agreement would bind them to any particular military action in each other's defence. Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East studies at Council on Foreign Relations, Henry Barkey, shares further insights.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

What Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East

S9

What Pakistan's defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey means for the Middle East Submitted by Zia Ur Rehman on Sat, 08/08/2026 - 12:25 The deal, which establishes that an armed attack on one signatory will be treated as an attack on all three, risks drawing Islamabad deeper into Middle Eastern rivalries Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif (right), Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (centre) and Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (left) meet in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 7 August 2026 to sign a joint defence agreement (Handout/Turkish Presidency Press Office/AFP) Off A new security pact between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey is reshaping the Middle East's strategic map, bringing together three of the Muslim world's most influential powers under a collective defence framework. Named after the holy city where it was signed on Friday, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement stipulates that an attack against one member is an attack against all three. Echoing Nato's Article 5, the clause gives the pact immediate geopolitical significance, even as the joint statement leaves specific military commitments vague. For Pakistan, the world's only nuclear-armed Muslim-majority state, the accord marks a striking departure from its traditionally cautious stance as a regional mediator. By standing alongside Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Islamabad is positioning its armed forces as a potential security guarantor at the heart of an emerging axis spanning South Asia and the Gulf. The pact signals a potentially significant shift. As the long-standing regional order anchored by Washington comes under increasing strain amid war and shifting alliances, Middle Eastern powers are seeking to take greater control of their own security, with Pakistan's nuclear and conventional military capabilities potentially providing a new anchor. The deal also comes as the Middle East's traditional security order faces unprecedented strain. The US and Israeli war on Iran has transformed the regional strategic landscape, with direct strikes reaching Saudi territory and commercial shipping severely disrupted across both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. "All three countries have a shared economic and security interest in preventing further escalation, which ultimately compelled them to sign the pact," a Pakistani security official monitoring the region told Middle East Eye on condition of anonymity. Disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have affected supplies of Saudi energy and fertilisers, sending shock waves through the global economy. Import-dependent countries such as Pakistan and Turkey have been among those particularly exposed to the disruption. 'All three countries have a shared economic and security interest in preventing further escalation, which ultimately compelled them to sign the pact' - Pakistani security official But the security calculus is even more consequential. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have experienced attacks linked to the broader regional conflict, while Islamabad and Ankara remain deeply concerned about cross-border instability spilling over from their lengthy frontiers with Iran. Ankara faces an additional security dilemma: the prospect that the arming of Iranian Kurdish militias by external powers could unravel its fragile, hard-won peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. The wider conflict has also emboldened Iran and its Houthi allies in Yemen, who have escalated direct attacks on Saudi territory. For Gulf leaders, the failure of traditional US security guarantees to deter such strikes has raised questions about Washington’s reliability as a security partner. The result is a decisive push by regional heavyweights to construct defence arrangements that rely less on external guarantees. Former Pakistani ambassador Asif Durrani described the pact as the "first concrete building block of an emerging regional security architecture", arguing that it signals a move towards greater regional ownership of security. "If this momentum continues, it could open the door to addressing decades-old conflicts, including the enduring Palestinian issue, through a more regionally driven approach,” Durrani wrote on X. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sign defence pact Read More » Analysts emphasise that the pact is not an isolated development, but rather the culmination of deepening trilateral cooperation. Michael Kugelman, senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council, described the pact as "a logical outgrowth of deepening security ties" among the three countries in recent months. It builds upon existing foundations. Riyadh and Islamabad signed a bilateral mutual defence agreement in late 2025, which saw roughly 8,000 Pakistani troops, fighter jets and air defence systems deployed to the kingdom, while Turkey remains a major defence supplier to both nations. For Washington, the pact could be particularly welcome. With its major focus on collective regional deterrence, with an eye to Iran, "it'll be received well in Washington, which wants to see more burden-sharing from top allies", Kugelman said on X. An economic lifeline in military uniform For Pakistan, however, the pact is about more than geopolitics. It is also deeply connected to the country's economic vulnerabilities, analysts said. The pact marks a notable shift for Islamabad, which spent recent months positioning itself as a diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran. While Pakistan helped broker the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding in June to temporarily halt regional hostilities, subsequent escalations narrowed its neutral stance. For a government battling persistent inflation and fiscal distress, strategic defence policy is now increasingly inseparable from financial necessity. Historically, Pakistan has leveraged its military strength to secure economic backing, particularly from the US and Saudi Arabia. This collective defence framework institutionalises that model, allowing Islamabad to monetise its operational capabilities, ranging from joint training and troop deployments to arms exports, in exchange for vital Gulf investments, energy concessions and diplomatic support. For Riyadh, Pakistan offers access to a large, experienced military with decades of combat and counterinsurgency experience. For Islamabad, closer security cooperation with Saudi Arabia offers the prospect of investment, financial assistance and a stronger economic relationship with one of the region’s most powerful states. "In this sense, Pakistan's military strength is becoming an economic asset as well as a strategic one," the security official told MEE. Saudi money, Turkish technology, Pakistani military power The emerging partnership also brings together three distinct forms of strategic power. Sheharyar Khan, a political analyst and senior adviser at Pakistan’s Ministry of Law and Justice, described the emerging combination as one in which Saudi Arabia provides the financial power, Turkey contributes technological innovation, and Pakistan supplies core military capability. 'Together, the three countries could form a security partnership whose capabilities extend far beyond traditional troop deployment' - Sheharyar Khan, political analyst "Together, the three countries could form a security partnership whose capabilities extend far beyond traditional troop deployments," Khan told MEE. Each state brings a complementary asset. Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s holiest sites, provides vast capital, energy market dominance and regional diplomatic weight. Turkey, which operates Nato's second-largest military, has an advanced and increasingly self-reliant defence industry, including expertise in unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare and precision-guided munitions, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers. Pakistan contributes a massive, combat-hardened army and the Muslim world’s sole nuclear deterrent. The risk of entrapment Yet the agreement also carries significant risks for Pakistan, experts said. Iran's response to the pact has been swift and critical. "The Saudis should know that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan does not bring them security, just as years of unilateral milking of the Americans did not bring them security," Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of Iran's parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, wrote on X, dismissing the arrangement. The response underscores Islamabad’s fundamental dilemma: deepening involvement in Gulf defence architecture risks fracturing its delicate, traditionally cautious relationship with Tehran. Analysts warn of "entrapment", the danger of Pakistan being dragged into foreign confrontations that do not serve its own national interests. Historically, Pakistan has avoided direct entanglements in Middle Eastern power struggles. Its parliament famously declined to join the Saudi-led Yemen coalition in 2015 because of domestic political and sectarian concerns. Home to a large Shia minority, some of whom see Iranian clergy as political and religious guides, Pakistan must also ensure that closer alignment with Saudi Arabia and Turkey is not perceived at home as an anti-Iranian stance that could inflame internal sectarian fault lines. 'Muslim security bloc' The agreement has sparked intense debate over whether it could evolve into a broader, multi-nation security bloc across the Muslim world. Retired senior Pakistani military official Muhammad Saeed suggested that additional Muslim countries from the region, and potentially beyond, could eventually join the framework. Bab al-Mandeb: US war on Iran gives Houthis new leverage over Saudi Arabia Read More » But he cautioned that military power alone would not determine the success of such an arrangement. "For Muslim states, the real and collective strength will not come only through military capabilities but primarily through long-term investments and collaboration in knowledge, innovation, discipline, character, and tolerant interpretation of sectarian sentiment," he wrote on X. The prospect of a more cohesive security grouping has already attracted attention in Israel. In February, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett explicitly warned against Turkey seeking a "hostile axis" with Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, "to surround Israel". Analysts, however, argue that Pakistan's nuclear status inevitably changes the strategic calculations surrounding the pact. For Saudi Arabia, closer defence ties with Islamabad could provide an additional layer of deterrence at a time when the kingdom faces threats from Iran while also navigating its relationship with Israel. The India factor The pact also has implications far beyond the Middle East. For Pakistan, closer ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey could provide a strategic counterweight to India. While Saudi Arabia maintains extensive economic and trade ties with New Delhi, the collective defence framework further strengthens Pakistan's role as a security partner for key Gulf powers. Although India's Ministry of External Affairs responded cautiously, saying that New Delhi was "closely following developments", Indian national security analysts are monitoring the situation with growing concern. "While most are obviously seeing this from a Middle East lens, it impacts other theatres as well. Pakistan's conflict-laden relationship with India [is] at the top of that list," Kabir Taneja, executive director of the Middle East programme at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based think tank, wrote on X. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, in a post on X, described the pact as "a very negative development for Indian interests", suggesting that India expand its strategic options with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Afghanistan. Diplomacy Islamabad News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

'Used as human bait': Leaked image shows elderly Palestinian men before execution by Israeli forces

S9

'Used as human bait': Leaked image shows elderly Palestinian men before execution by Israeli forces Submitted by MEE staff on Sat, 08/08/2026 - 09:38 Journalist says Nadi and Ali Marouf were abducted, used as human shields and killed in northern Gaza in November 2024 The last known photograph of Palestinian men Nadi Marouf and Ali Marouf, who were reportedly killed in November 2024 after being used as human shields (Younis Tirawi/X) Off A newly leaked photograph shows two blindfolded elderly Palestinian men from Beit Lahia in Gaza, hours before Israeli forces killed them in November 2024, according to Palestinian journalist Younis Tirawi, who published the image. The photograph shows Israeli military personnel standing between two blindfolded men, whom Tirawi identified in a post on X as Nadi Marouf and Ali Marouf. He said the photograph was taken hours before their deaths and that the two men were "used as human bait and then executed". In an earlier post in October 2025, Tirawi had said that troops from the 92nd Battalion of the Kfir Brigade abducted the men from Beit Lahia and held them as human shields for several days. "Israeli troops from the 92nd Battalion of the Kfir Brigade abducted two elderly Palestinians from Beit Lahia and used them as human shields for days before killing them," Tirawi wrote. The Palestine Chronicle reported in October 2025 that the men had been detained for several days before being released near al-Tawam roundabout and shot. The report said that images showed the men stripped to their underwear, with one apparently having his hands tied behind his back. It added that they had been forced to enter buildings before Israeli soldiers went inside. Ramy Abdu, chairman of the Geneva-based Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, said at the time: "After being used as human shields, their relatives found them after three days and they had been executed. " Israeli soldier says every unit 'keeps a Palestinian as human shield' Read More » The newly shared photograph adds to a series of images and testimonies that have raised allegations about the treatment of Palestinian civilians during Israeli military operations in northern Gaza. Independent reporting has previously documented incidents in which Palestinian civilians were forced to enter buildings and tunnels ahead of Israeli soldiers to check for explosives or fighters. In May 2025, the Israeli army said it was investigating several such cases and acknowledged that using Palestinians as human shields or coercing them into participating in military operations was "strictly prohibited" under its orders. A United Nations investigation into Israeli military conduct in Gaza previously concluded that forcing Palestinian civilians to enter houses ahead of soldiers amounted to the use of human shields and violated international humanitarian law. Wider abuses An Associated Press investigation published in 2025 included testimony from Palestinians who said they had been forced to enter buildings and tunnels ahead of Israeli troops. Israeli soldiers also described the practice as widespread. Al Jazeera subsequently reported on the findings, citing seven Palestinians and two Israeli military officers who described the practice. The developments also come as Palestinian prisoners continue to report harsh detention conditions. Dr Mazen Rantisi, a 71-year-old Palestinian physician known as the "doctor of the poor", was detained during a pre-dawn Israeli raid on his home in Ramallah on 21 June, according to Palestinian and rights organisations. He serves as chairman of the board of the Health Work Committees, a Palestinian organisation that provides medical services. Rantisi told a lawyer that prison authorities had withheld his regular medication during his first 10 days in Ofer Prison and continued to deny him one of his medicines. He also said that prison units repeatedly raided his cell and beat detainees. His lawyer, Saja Misherqi Baransi, said Rantisi had rapidly lost weight after being given small portions of food that he described as unfit for consumption, including mouldy bread, almost-rotten tomatoes, uncooked hummus and foul-smelling rice. Palestinian ‘doctor of the poor’ says he faces abuse, medical neglect in Israeli prison Read More » Belgian rights group Viva Salud said Rantisi and another Health Work Committees official were arrested on June 21 and expressed concern about their health and access to appropriate medical care. Meanwhile, Gaza’s broader humanitarian crisis continues to deepen. The Gaza health ministry has reported more than 73,000 Palestinian deaths since the war began in October 2023, according to recent reports. The scale of the killings remains difficult to establish fully because thousands of bodies are believed to remain beneath destroyed buildings. A mass funeral in Gaza on 4 August included 112 people killed in a 2023 Israeli air strike whose remains were only recently recovered. Gaza authorities have estimated that thousands more people remain buried beneath rubble. The UN has previously recorded 193 malnutrition-related deaths in Gaza, including 96 children. In July 2025 alone, 11,877 children between six and 59 months who were screened were found to be suffering from acute malnutrition, including 2,562 with severe acute malnutrition. UN agencies have continued to warn that food insecurity and malnutrition remain critical. An analysis cited by the UN humanitarian office projected that more than 100,000 children between 6 and 59 months could suffer acute malnutrition through October 2026, including more than 31,000 severe cases. The continuing allegations over the treatment of civilians, detainees and the dead have added to international scrutiny of Israel's conduct in Gaza, where humanitarian agencies continue to report severe restrictions on access to food, medicine and other essential supplies. Israel's genocide in Gaza News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Israel has the power to dominate, but not to lead the region

S9

Israel has the power to dominate, but not to lead the region Submitted by Hesham Gaafar on Tue, 08/04/2026 - 21:18 Tactical victories in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran have not built up Tel Aviv's hegemony - they have eroded it A fighter loyal to Yemen’s Houthi movement walks over depictions of the Israeli and US flags during a demonstration in Sanaa on 22 July 2026 (Mohammed Huwais/AFP) On Domination, according to philosopher Antonio Gramsci, is the capacity to coerce, to compel obedience through force. Hegemony is leadership secured through consent - an order that feels natural to those who live under it, so minds acquiesce before bodies are made to obey. Domination can prohibit and destroy; it cannot persuade, build or lead. This is the standard against which Israel ’s supposed “hegemony” should be judged in light of its continuous war, which has extended from 2023 to the present day. Israel appears to have reached the height of its military power, dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure, killing Hezbollah’s leadership, occupying parts of Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, and gutting Iran ’s missile and nuclear programmes while killing its supreme leader. These tactical victories, however, have not resulted in the construction of hegemony, but its erosion. They have exposed the fact that genuine hegemony never existed - only naked domination, sustained by an American strategic umbrella. Size is not power, superiority is not leadership, and presence is not integration. Measured across three dimensions - the global economy, the region’s rules and regional networks - Israeli hegemony is either steadily eroding or never existed at all. Israel’s high-tech sector is roughly 17 percent of the country’s GDP, with its export share reaching a record 57 percent in the first four months of last year, and the country boasts the highest civilian research and development (R&D) spending relative to GDP. But one cannot confuse the size of a sector with the power to write the rules that govern it. Mastering a game whose rules were written by someone else is excellence, not power. The picture is also less rosy than it appears: Israel’s own Innovation Authority warns of stagnating employment, a decline in R&D staff and a shrinking number of startups. Paradox exposed The one field where Israel genuinely sets global rules is cybersecurity: it hosts R&D centres for seven of the world’s top 10 companies in the field, and its cloud security firm Wiz was recently acquired by Google for $32bn. In another major recent deal, Palo Alto Networks acquired Israeli information security company CyberArk for $25bn. But these deals expose a paradox: the pinnacle of Israeli tech success is its absorption into the American ecosystem - excellence within one room of a vast palace, not ownership of it. Step outside cybersecurity and the claim fades. The shekel is not a reserve currency, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange orbits Nasdaq, and Israel’s security dependence on Washington is close to existential, with more than $130bn in American assistance since 1948. Military dominance remains. Hegemony does not, and the gap between the two keeps widening The Iran war tested this: Ben Gurion Airport shut down for 40 days, yet markets stayed resilient. The Google-Wiz deal closed during an active regional conflict, reflecting dependent integration rather than self-sufficiency. This is the resilience of a patient on life support, not of healthy lungs. But the greater danger is the erosion of Israel’s most important asset: human capital. Roughly 90,000 Israelis left the country in 2025 for three or more consecutive months, and Israeli tech firms are increasingly employing people abroad. Tellingly, this shift began with the domestic judicial-reform crisis in early 2023, before a single Hamas rocket was fired in the Gaza war - a vote with people’s feet, by the professionals who generate Israel’s only genuine structural advantage. Israel’s position is neither “startup nation” nor collapse, but rather a deeply integrated, subordinate economy whose niche is gradually eroding. Shifting perceptions Hegemony’s second dimension - legitimacy, the acceptance of power rather than merely its possession - cannot be measured in budgets. Does Israel lead the region, or merely possess the capacity to disrupt it? Its military superiority is not entirely its own. During the Iran war, US forces fired hundreds of interceptors in Israel’s defence, drawing down nearly half of the Pentagon’s Thaad stockpile. Roughly 80 percent of Israel’s own Arrow inventory was depleted within weeks, underscoring that it is a highly capable deterrent inside a costly American security architecture - not an invincible, self-sufficient power. If Israel’s military position reveals dependence, its legitimacy reveals open erosion: an International Court of Justice genocide case, International Criminal Court warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, a UN inquiry finding that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, and 157 states now recognising Palestine. The deepest shift, though, is in public consciousness: a 2025 Pew survey of 24 countries found 62 percent held unfavourable views of Israel, against 29 percent favourable. This trend holds even with Israel’s principal ally, as around 60 percent of US adults now have an unfavourable view of Israel. Across the Arab world, 87 percent oppose recognising Israel, while more than a quarter name it the greatest regional threat. So who is writing the rules of the emerging order? Saudi Arabia still rejects normalisation, absent an irreversible path to Palestinian statehood. The Gaza ceasefire was imposed on Israel, not brokered by it, and the Iran-US nuclear deal is being negotiated without Tel Aviv. Regional diplomacy is driven instead by Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, Oman, Turkey and Pakistan - none dependent on Israel, which can obstruct but not impose its own vision. It retains the power to veto, not to lead. Here lies the deeper paradox: each of Israel’s military victories has generated a corresponding loss of legitimacy. Has Israel become a hub around which the Middle East is reorganising, or the obstacle around which new networks are built? Regional air defences intercepted thousands of drones and missiles during the Iran war, seemingly showing integration - but this is an American-led architecture, not a network linking Israel to its neighbours. Arab states cooperate with Washington, and Washington cooperates with Israel; the bridge is the US, not Israel. Widening gap The same pattern holds in energy and trade. Gas exports to Egypt are cited as proof of Israel’s indispensable role - yet this collapsed at the first real test, when Israel shut its biggest gas field for roughly 33 days amid the Iran war, leaving Egypt with electricity shortages and costly LNG imports. Similarly, the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor names Haifa as its gateway, yet Haifa’s capacity is dwarfed by regional rivals, and routes bypassing Israel are multiplying. Across all three dimensions, the same pattern recurs: Israel displays power without legitimacy and presence without integration, while maintaining a core dependency on the American strategic umbrella. Israel does not anchor networks through its own gravitational pull, but rather hangs from a single supporting thread; if that thread weakens, the structure becomes unstable. Over two years of genocide, Gaza endured. But Israel lost the world Read More » This is what the erosion, or absence, of hegemony means. Israel is not becoming militarily weaker - its superiority remains formidable - but that superiority has failed to convert into authority that sets the region’s rules, commands legitimacy, or draws neighbouring states to organise their interests around it willingly. Military dominance remains. Hegemony does not, and the gap between the two keeps widening. One trend deserves attention: the gradual effort of Arab and regional states to organise themselves around Israel as little as possible. Over time, Israel risks shifting from an indispensable node to a function that can increasingly be assumed by Gulf, European, Indian, Turkish and Egyptian actors - especially if Washington’s commitment wanes, and alternative corridors multiply. Yet this should not be mistaken for a prediction of imminent collapse. Domination without hegemony can endure for decades before unravelling; a crisis of legitimacy is necessary for decline, but not sufficient, and naked power can survive so long as its patron bears the costs. The erosion described here will only constrain Israeli power if the region remains capable of collective political action. Should resistance disappear, and neighbouring societies fragment into competing enclaves, Israel’s failure to integrate could become an advantage rather than a liability - and when the American umbrella eventually weakens, as every imperial guarantee does, the underlying landscape may become clearer: not a region organised around Israel, but one built despite it. Networks, like water, find a way around an obstacle - but only where a channel has first been carved. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. Israel's genocide in Gaza Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Morning recap

S9

Morning recap Good morning Middle East Eye readers, Secretary-general of the 57-member Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Hissen Brahim Taha, has welcomed the joint defence agreement signed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on Friday. Bahrain, Yemen’s internationally recognised government and a former Qatari prime minister also welcomed the pact. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was open to the participation of “other friendly nations”. Two civilians were, meanwhile, killed as Houthis struck the oil-rich city of Marib again on Friday. On Saturday, the armed forces said they responded to the attacks. Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian said Tehran is prepared to pursue dialogue to protect its national interests but will not accept demands that undermine its sovereignty or defensive capabilities. Here are the latest developments: • A US official has said progress is being made between Iran and Oman on the Strait of Hormuz and "we expect a deal soon". • United States Central Command said that it has redirected 51 commercial vessels, disabled two, and boarded two others since it reinstated a naval blockade of Iran on 14 July. • Several Palestinians, including two officers of an ambulance, were injured in a series of attacks and raids carried out by Israeli forces and settlers across the West Bank. • At least 300 children — an average of one child every day — have been killed in Gaza in the 300 days since a ceasefire was announced in October 2025, according to Unicef. • Israeli artillery shelled the vicinity of the town of al-Mansouri early Saturday morning • Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained subdued on 7 August, with eight confirmed crossings, down 33% from the previous day, according to maritime traffic tracking firm Kpler. • A top United States general has said that the country needs “an off-ramp” from the war with Iran, fearing that the military options currently being considered by the Trump administration could backfire.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Two killed, 14 wounded as Houthis strike Marib again

S9

Two killed, 14 wounded as Houthis strike Marib again Yemen's Houthis launched ballistic missiles and drones at displacement camps and residential neighbourhoods in the city of Marib on Friday, killing two people and wounding 14, Reuters reported, citing state news agency SABA. Yemen's army said early on Saturday it had responded against Houthi forces on several fronts along the lines of contact. In a video broadcast by Yemen TV, a spokesperson for Yemen's armed forces said the operation achieved its objectives and warned that continued Houthi attacks would be met with a military response “without leniency. pic. ” The army did not give details of the operations or say when they took place. عاجل الناطق الرسمي للقوات المسلحة اليمنية العقيد ماجد النزيلي القوات المسلحة نفذت عمل عسكري ضد العناصر الحوثية الارهابية وعتادها العسكري. twitter. com/KvAhprLqn9 — قناة اليمن الفضائية | YemenTv (@yementvyem) August 8, 2026

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Pezeshkian says Iran open to dialogue, warns against regional divisions

S9

Pezeshkian says Iran open to dialogue, warns against regional divisions Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian has said Tehran is prepared to pursue dialogue to protect its national interests but will not accept demands that undermine its sovereignty or defensive capabilities, IRNA reported. In an address to the Iranian public, Pezeshkian stressed improved relations with neighbouring countries and the need to prevent regional divisions, the report said. The president rejected claims that his administration had pressured the country’s leadership into accepting negotiations. Pezeshkian stressed that Iran regarded Muslim countries as brothers and questioned why Muslim states should become involved in conflict with one another, IRNA reported. He warned that the US and Israel sought to bring Persian Gulf countries together against Iran, while Tehran worked to prevent it. Tehran would not accept dismantling Iran’s military and defence capabilities, while pursuing dialogue when it protected national interests.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

CNN: Top general says US needs ‘off ramp’ from Iran war

S9

CNN: Top general says US needs ‘off ramp’ from Iran war A top United States general has said that the country needs “an off-ramp” from the war with Iran, fearing that the military options currently being considered by the Trump administration could backfire, according to CNN. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Dan Caine has privately said in recent weeks that airstrikes alone are unlikely to accomplish the administration’s goals, CNN reported, citing sources familiar with the matter. Caine has discussed the possibility of an off-ramp with vice president JD Vance, CIA chief John Ratcliffe and the secretary of state Marco Rubio, the report said.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Trump ally Abelardo de la Espriella sworn in as Colombia president

S9

Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella took office Friday, vowing to wage war on drug-running guerrillas and usher in a new era of close ties with the United States. The flamboyant former lawyer brings a lurch to the right for the Andean nation, vowing to bomb jungle cocaine labs, build “mega prisons” and slash the size of the state. De la Espriella and his Vice-President Jose Manuel Restrepo cheered, embraced and performed their campaign’s characteristic military salute after taking their...

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Yemen’s Houthis claim attack on Marib hit Saudi-backed forces

S9

Yemen’s Houthis claim attack on Marib hit Saudi-backed forces Yemen's Houthis attacked and hit Saudi-backed forces, depots and military equipment near the central city of Marib, the group's spokesman Yahya Saree said on Friday. In a post on Telegram, Saree said the Houthis will continue to “strike forcefully any Saudi mobilisation or forces brought by the Saudi enemy to maintain the siege imposed on our country”.

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Exclusive: ICC judges order Taliban case split from Afghanistan probe that covers US troops

S9

Exclusive: ICC judges order Taliban case split from Afghanistan probe that covers US troops Judges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) have ordered prosecutors to open a standalone investigation into allegations of gender persecution by the Taliban, separating it from the court's long-running Afghanistan war crimes probe that covered US nationals, Middle East Eye can reveal. According to court documents obtained by MEE through independent sources, a three-judge panel in pre-trial chamber II issued the request to the Office of the Prosecutor in mid-July. If prosecutors proceed, the Taliban investigation will effectively be split from a broader Afghanistan inquiry looking into alleged war crimes committed since 2003 by Afghan National Security Forces, the US military and CIA personnel, in addition to the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) group. The move is likely to raise questions about whether the court is seeking to ease tensions with Washington by signalling that it will no longer pursue allegations against US forces and their allies. Read more: Exclusive: ICC judges order Taliban case split from Afghanistan probe that covers US troops Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala, vice-president of the ICC and president of pre-trial chamber II (ICC/file photo)

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Saudi Arabia's last major oil route comes under Houthi pressure

S9

Saudi Arabia's last major oil route comes under Houthi pressure Submitted by Gaspard Rouffin on Thu, 08/06/2026 - 16:28 Attacks on Saudi ships have had a limited impact so far, but an escalation towards the north of the waterway could increase economic pressure on the kingdom Container ships are seen anchored near the Bab al-Mandab strait off Yemen's coast, in the Gulf of Aden, on 6 August 2026 (AFP) Off The Houthis said on Wednesday that they had fired ballistic missiles at the NCC Wafaa, a Saudi oil tanker, off the coast of Yanbu, a major Saudi port city in the northern Red Sea. It is the northernmost attack by the Yemeni group since it began a blockade on Saudi Arabia on 22 July, and analysts warn a shift north towards Egypt and the Suez Canal would lead to increasing economic pressure on the Gulf kingdom. Until now, the Houthis had mostly targeted ships off Yemen's coast, in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The group accused the Wafaa of violating the blockade and ignoring warning calls before it was struck. Since the US-Israel war on Iran began, Saudi Arabia had kept part of its oil flowing through the alternative route of Bab al-Mandab. But the Houthi blockade on the strait is now limiting that option. Ibrahim Jalal, a Yemen analyst, described the move as a “bid to deny the Suez Canal rerouting” – the alternative route Saudi Arabia has increasingly relied on since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year. Jalal argues that the Houthis are threatening to expand the conflict further north in the Red Sea for two reasons. Externally, he said, the move is intended to strengthen Iran's "bargaining position" over the Strait of Hormuz; internally, it aims to "restore coercive leverage over Riyadh ". Matthew Wright, an analyst at the ship-tracking firm Kpler, told the BBC this week: "In terms of threat to the trade of crude, we're at the worst period that we've been in since this crisis began. " The Houthis claim to have hit eight tankers since the blockade was declared, at least five of which were Saudi and one Indian -flagged, the latter sinking near Bab al-Mandab on 4 August. Only four strikes have been independently verified by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations Centre (UKMTO), the international reference for maritime security incidents. The Saudi authorities have not confirmed any of the strikes. Houthi strikes in the Red Sea Yahya Saree, the Houthi military spokesperson, said on 5 August that at least 29 Saudi vessels had turned away from Bab al-Mandab during the first two weeks of the blockade. Calling the move “blockade for blockade”, Saree said the group would “respond to any escalation with escalation”. ​​​​The attack on 5 August marked the northernmost Houthi strike in the Red Sea since the start of the blockade on 22 July. Satellite imagery by Google. Source: UKMTO and Yemeni media Salah Ali Salah, a security affairs researcher at the Sanaa Centre, told Middle East Eye, “the Houthis are still on an escalatory trajectory”, adding that he did not believe they had “yet deployed the full weight of their maritime capabilities against Saudi Arabia”. While some Saudi vessels are turning away from Bab al-Mandab, such as six tankers that took a significantly longer route around Africa this week, others are switching off their transponders to cross the waterway instead, Bloomberg reported. Saudi oil exports normally account for around 66 percent of Bab al-Mandab traffic, and the Red Sea carries 10 to 12 percent of global trade overall. Ryan Bohl, a senior Mena analyst at RANE, a global risk intelligence company, said it was “unlikely” the Houthis could close off “all traffic” in the northern Red Sea. Instead, they could demonstrate they are a “credible threat” by hitting Egyptian ports and the Suez Canal, forcing the Saudis to “take measures to hide their ships”. This would include “turning off transponders” and paying crews “substantially more”, forcing Saudi shipping companies to “absorb all the war risks associated with such an outcome”. Rerouting through the Suez Canal Rerouting around Africa also forces Saudi tankers to pass through the Suez Canal to reach Yanbu, adding at least four weeks to the journey for Asia-bound ships, the main destination for Saudi crude. That route is itself constrained. Saudi Arabia typically ships using Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) holding around 2 million barrels. But the Suez Canal’s limited depth means it must use Suezmax carriers with a capacity of 1 million barrels, or partially loaded VLCCs. A VLCC carries roughly double the cargo capacity of a tanker capable of passing through the Suez canal. Infographics by Reuters. “If VLCCs have to pass through Suez partially loaded, it will impact how much Saudi is able to get through,” Bohl said. Tankers bound for Asia will need more journeys to deliver the same volume, adding an estimated $1.6m in fuel costs plus a $1m Suez toll fee per transit. Salah said the issue was not “simply whether Saudi Arabia can find another route, but whether it can find one that preserves the same scale, cost and efficiency of its existing export system”. Bohl said the Suez restrictions would be “partially offset by offloading through the Sumed pipeline”, one of the pipelines that now serve as Saudi Arabia’s main contingency for consistent crude deliveries. The Sumed pipeline in Egypt lets tankers offload part of their cargo in deep water before crossing the canal, then reload it on the other side. Increased uncertainty in the northern Red Sea and Suez Canal would complicate Saudi Arabia’s last safe option for strategic oil exports. (Map by MEE; Source: CIA) Growing exports in Yanbu The East-West pipeline, which crosses Saudi Arabia coast to coast, transfers oil from the Gulf to the Red Sea, where the kingdom’s largest refineries are concentrated. It has been especially useful for moving oil east to Yanbu, where the export volumes have more than tripled since the Strait of Hormuz closed, according to Bloomberg data. Some analysts see the Wafaa strike as a possible step towards attacks on non-tanker vessels. Salah said the “greater danger would be the expansion of maritime targeting to non-tanker vessels and imports”. He added the broader danger was “the precedent this creates”. Saudi oil exports through the Gulf have fallen since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with most shipments now departing from Yanbu (Data from Bloomberg) But Bohl argues this is not in the Houthis’ best interest. A “major new offensive” from Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in Yemen, particularly one targeting Hodeidah, their “own critical Red Sea lifeline”, would have severe consequences for the group. If the Houthis did escalate, Bohl said, Saudi Arabia “would face the same kinds of logistical issues that the littoral Gulf Arab states” are currently dealing with under the Strait of Hormuz closure, though Riyadh would likely be better prepared, given its land routes through Jordan and air options. Declining Saudi oil exports The Houthi blockade on Bab al-Mandab has had less of an impact on Saudi oil exports so far than the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Exports through Hormuz have declined sharply since its closure on 4 March, but Saudi Arabia has shifted most departures to the Red Sea instead, making that waterway especially sensitive now. Kpler, a maritime intelligence firm, estimates Bab al-Mandab volumes have increased eightfold, and Yanbu had one of its busiest days on record on 1 August, with five supertankers positioned for loading. Oil infrastructure at Saudi Arabia's western Red Sea port of Yanbu on 4 March 2026 (AFP / Planet Labs) The Houthis targeted Saudi Aramco plants in July, but CEO Amin Nasser said there had been no material operational or financial impact. Aramco reported on Tuesday that second-quarter profits surged 33 percent, driven by higher energy prices from the war on Iran and the Saudi pipelines bypassing Hormuz. According to Bohl, “it remains to be seen whether or not Saudi exports will see a major dip or if this is just downward pressure that they can adjust to”. This week, hopes of an Iran-Oman deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz led Saudi Arabia to cut its main oil price for Asia by 50 cents to $2 a barrel, a sign that Riyadh does not view the Houthi blockade in the Red Sea as a grave threat. Salah said the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz “would certainly ease pressure on global energy markets, but it would not resolve the Houthi problem in the Red Sea”. War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Video: Houthi strikes on Saudi-backed troops

S9

Video: Houthi strikes on Saudi-backed troops Yemen's Houthi movement killed more than 60 Saudi-backed troops belonging to the internationally recognised Yemeni government between Thursday and Friday, marking the deadliest toll since the civil war stalled under a 2022 truce. pic. Yemen's Houthi movement killed more than 60 Saudi-backed troops belonging to the internationally recognised Yemeni government between Thursday and Friday, marking the deadliest toll since the civil war stalled under a 2022 truce. twitter. com/CQ2zuczKp7 — Middle East Eye (@MiddleEastEye) August 7, 2026

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Exclusive: ICC judges order Taliban case split from Afghanistan probe that covers US troops

S9

Exclusive: ICC judges order Taliban case split from Afghanistan probe that covers US troops Submitted by Sondos Asem on Fri, 08/07/2026 - 10:20 Decision by pre-trial chamber comes after the Trump administration threatened to 'dismantle' the ICC over the Afghanistan and Palestine investigations Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala, vice-president of the ICC and president of pre-trial chamber II (ICC/file photo) Off Judges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) have ordered prosecutors to open a standalone investigation into allegations of gender persecution by the Taliban, separating it from the court's long-running Afghanistan war crimes probe that covered US nationals, Middle East Eye can reveal. According to court documents obtained by MEE through independent sources, a three-judge panel in pre-trial chamber II issued the request to the Office of the Prosecutor in mid-July. If prosecutors proceed, the Taliban investigation will effectively be split from a broader Afghanistan inquiry looking into alleged war crimes committed since 2003 by Afghan National Security Forces, the US military and CIA personnel, in addition to the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) group. The move is likely to raise questions about whether the court is seeking to ease tensions with Washington by signalling that it will no longer pursue allegations against US forces and their allies. The chamber's communication came days after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio threatened to "dismantle the ICC, brick by brick", in remarks referencing the court's 2020 decision authorising an investigation into alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan. Since February 2025, the US has imposed retaliatory financial and visa sanctions on court officials in connection with the Afghanistan and Palestine investigations, citing efforts to prosecute nationals or allies of the US. ​​The first target was Karim Khan, the former prosecutor of the ICC, who was controversially removed by member states last month after an 18-month long misconduct probe. Rubio says US will dismantle ICC 'brick by brick' Read More » Also targeted were eight judges, three of whom - Kimberly Prost, Solomy Bossa and Luz Ibanez - were members of the 2020 Appeals Chamber that authorised the Afghanistan investigation. The sanctions came despite the decision by Khan in 2021 to deprioritise the strand of the Afghanistan probe concerning US military and CIA personnel, as well as former Afghan government forces, in order to focus the investigation on the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province. The ICC already issued arrest warrants a year ago for Supreme Leader of the Taliban Hibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, the group's Chief Justice, for the crime against humanity of gender persecution. The applications were prepared by a team of lawyers under the leadership of Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan, who oversees the Afghanistan investigation, and Special Adviser on Gender Crimes Professor Lisa Davis, who authored the office’s policy on gender-based crimes. The deputy prosecutor has been among those sanctioned by the US government over the past year, while Davis has filed and won a court case in New York shielding her from potential punitive measures by the administration. MEE reported in December that diplomats at the ICC's annual Assembly of States Parties meeting in The Hague said the Trump administration had pressed the court to drop its investigations into Afghanistan and Palestine as a condition for lifting sanctions. It also demanded states to amend the ICC’s founding treaty - The Rome Statute - to prevent the prosecution of nationals from countries that aren’t members of the court, such as the US and Israel. At the end of its meeting, however, the assembly issued a declaration resisting those demands and rejecting calls to amend the Rome Statute, without naming the US directly. 'Materially different context' The Afghanistan situation at the ICC dates back to November 2017, when prosecutors first requested authorisation to investigate alleged crimes committed since 2003, including by Afghan and US forces as well as the Taliban and the IS-K group. That request was initially rejected by a differently composed pre-trial chamber in 2019, before the appeals chamber overturned the decision in March 2020 and authorised the investigation to proceed. The probe was suspended after a deferral request from the then Afghan government, and only resumed in late 2022, a decision upheld on appeal in April 2023. In November 2024, six states - Chile, Costa Rica, Spain, France, Luxembourg and Mexico - jointly referred allegations of crimes against women and girls committed since the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, asking prosecutors to fold them into the existing Afghanistan investigation. ‘Financial death penalty’: How US sanctions are upending the lives of ICC judges Read More » Weeks later, in January 2025, then-Prosecutor Khan applied for arrest warrants, arguing the gender persecution allegations already fell within the scope of the 2020 authorisation, and the warrants were later issued for Akhundzada and Haqqani. Now, in their latest decision obtained by MEE, the pre-trial chamber II found that the post-2021 conduct by the Taliban is "materially different" from the armed conflict-related violence that defined the original, conflict-nexus investigation authorised in 2020. The judges on the chamber, Rosario Salvatore Aitala (presiding), Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godinez and Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, directed prosecutors, if they still consider the legal threshold met, to open a wholly separate investigation based on the states' 2024 referral, and to notify the ICC Presidency of that referral, which the decision notes had not yet happened. "The Referral concerns allegations of gender and political persecution through the adoption, implementation and enforcement of discriminatory decrees, policies and restrictions made possible by the Taliban's exercise of de facto governmental authority, rather than conduct allegedly committed by the Taliban as an insurgent armed group during the armed conflict," the judges said. They cited the prosecutor's previous recognition that the conduct of the Taliban after seizing power in August 2021 was not based on armed attacks against the civilian population, but rather the imposition of "discriminatory rules and prohibitions on the population directly" and punishing those "whom they considered did not conform". "The allegations in the Referral therefore arise in a materially different factual and institutional context, involve distinct alleged modes of commission, do not appear to be related to any armed conflict, and concern conduct occurring after the Taliban’s assumption of governmental de facto authority. "In light of the above, the Chamber considers that the conduct identified in the Referral constitutes a sufficiently distinct subset of alleged events that, in the interests of the proper administration of justice and the orderly management of the Court's proceedings, warrants a separate investigation," they said. Dormant investigation The judges also flagged that the original Afghanistan investigation, the one that nominally covers alleged crimes by all parties, has now sat dormant for years, and pointed prosecutors towards a newly available procedure allowing them to formally close the situation record. ICC states decision on Karim Khan ‘inherently political’, says leading criminal law expert Read More » In a footnote, the chamber said: "Considering that more than three years have elapsed since the Chamber authorised the resumption of the investigation into the Situation in Afghanistan and that no proceedings are presently pending in relation to the conduct covered by that authorisation, the Chamber draws the Prosecution’s attention to the recently implemented regulation 66 ter of the Regulations of the Court, which allows the Prosecution to request the closure of a situation record when it does not anticipate any further investigatory or prosecutorial activities in relation thereto. " The office of the prosecutor has yet to make a decision on the closure of the original Afghanistan investigation or the opening of a new one. MEE reached out to the office for comment but did not receive a response by time of publication. International law News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

scenario pending

Military · Geopolitical

⚔️

Houthi missile and drone attacks kill dozens of Yemeni government troops

S9

Houthi missile and drone attacks kill dozens of Yemeni government troops At least 38 members of Yemen 's government forces were killed and 29 others were wounded in missile and drone attacks carried out by Houthis on Thursday, according to AFP. The attack marked the deadliest assault on forces of Yemen's internationally recognised government since the 2022 United Nations-brokered truce, military officials have said. The Houthis said the attacks were in retaliation for the "Saudi-backed military buildup", as Yemen's long-running conflict shows signs of intensifying alongside the broader US - Iran confrontation. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the group targeted government military positions with ballistic missiles and drones, naming al-Ruwaik, al-Thaniyah and al-Abr as among the areas struck. "We are prepared to confront any escalation," Saree said. Read more: Houthi missile and drone attacks kill dozens of Yemeni government troops Yemeni government forces deployed in the southern port city of Mukalla, Hadramawt province, 20 January 2026 (Fadel Senna/AFP)

scenario pending
← PreviousPage 94 of 302Next →